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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report Summarizes the research work performed under
the project
"Nuclear Plant Reliability Analysis - Optimization of
Test Intervals for Standby Systems in Nuclear Power Plants"
as outlined in the Agreement or Detailed Scope of Work as of
November 21, 1977. The section numbers used below refer to those
employed in this agreement.
1. Collection and Review of Available Information on Test
Interval Optimization
An extensive literature review on analytical methods for
test interval optimization has been performed and its results are
reported. It has been found that analytical methods are only avail-
able for single component systems and a limited number of majority
voting systems (k-out-of-n systems). This analysis of complex
technical systems with these formulations is questionable, although
they provide first estimates. Some of the equations found in the
literature differ from others with respect to the extent of handling
imperfect testing, test caused failures and the like. When these
effects are included in the analysis, an explicit solution for
the test interval is no longer possible even for a single compo-
nent. At the end of this literature review it became quite apparent,
that the analytical methods must be recognized as convenient
-2-
guidance into this special area of reliability analysis. However,
on the other hand, the limitation for practical work became
also obvious, especially for systems of technical interest.
2. Review and Assessment of Technical Specification
The information supplied by the utilities has been reviewed.
All efforts were concentrated upon subtask 2a, involving diesel
generators.
3. Data Collection and Analysis of Diesel Generators
A literature review has been performed on diesel generator
failures covering reports issued after the publication of WASH-
1400. The data are listed in Appendix A which also summarizes
the analysis and the comparison with the WASH-1400 results. For
the purpose of this study a conservative set of data has been
used consisting of the most conservative data found in either
assessment. There are some indications, that the data unavail-
ability upon demand of D.G.s may be lower by a factor of about 3.
5. Development of the Methodology for the Optimization of
Test Intervals
Starting point of the development of a methodology was the
optimization study of test intervals for a diesel generator unit
by applying various strategies suggested by different authors.
All of these methods were compared and recommendations given.
Based on these findings a simplified Auxiliary Feedwater System
as an example of a multi-component system was studied. The pur-
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pose of this study was primarily to answer the question whether
optimum test intervals for single component systems can be equally
well applied for multicomponent systems. Our results indicate
that this is generally not the case. Under certain circumstances,
lumping procedures may be found which make the single component
formulation work, however, a much more reliable way to obtain the
optimum test interval for complex systems is by using a computer
code in an iterative manner. For this purpose, the NRC-code
FRANTIC has been made operational at MIT and benchmarked against
a variety of analytical and numerical codes. The results of this
study indicate that FRANTIC is a useful engineering tool with a
high degree of flexibility.
The tested code is available for the sponsors upon request.
6. Applications
The results obtained from the analytical procedures were
compared to FRANTIC results for the Aux-Feed System. It was found
that they do not necessarily agree. After the limitations of the
analytical formulations have been detected, it was decided to
perform all other optimization studies by using FRANTIC. These
studies included the Emergency Power System, a blackout study
and a special study concerning test caused failures and detection
inefficiency.
Each of these studies addressed different aspects of test
interval optimization which are given in full detail in the main
report.
During the work various shortcomings of FRANTIC became
apparent, among them
- the inconvenience for user to derive the system unavail-
abilility function rather than providing the fault tree
as input
- the lack of the code to account for wearout
- the lack of any physical model behind test caused
failures, detection inefficiencies, etc.
- the need for the propagation of uncertainties in the
input data with proper account of possibly different
distributions to the fault tree top event
Despite all of these drawbacks, it is felt that with the methodology
developed during this project a technically sound basis and starting point
are given for the utilities to enter the field of probabilistic
system analysis in the near future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Engineered safety systems are standby systems. They are
tested periodically to confirm that they are operational and then
returned to the standby status. Although some failures of com-
ponents in standby systems are self-annunciating, there are
other unsafe failures that are not revealed until the next perio-
dic test. The longer the interval between test, the higher the
probability that a failure has occurred since the last test.
On the other hand, testing the system too frequently may take
it out of service too often or even wear it out prematurely
both of which lead to increased unavailability.
To be meaningful, any reliability goal must be enforced
throughout the lifetime of the nuclear power plant. As a result,
these goals are of concern to the design engineer at the concep-
tual stage, as well as to the plant operator, who must demonstrate
continued performance capability of systems.
The purpose of this research in the general subject of testing
engineered safety systems and concentrates specifically on the
following areas:
1. The time interval between tests as a design consideration;
2. Optimizing the availability by proper selection of the
time interval between tests;
3. Adjusting the time interval between tests on the basis
of field data on failure rates to assure conformance
to an availability goal over the nuclear power plant
lifetime.
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Before any further reference is made to availability and
unavailability, it seems to be appropriate to give their defini-
tions as summarized in the IEEE - Standard [1];
Availability: The characteristic of an item expressed by
the probability that it will be operational at a randomly
selected future in time.
Unavailability: The numerical complement of availability.
Unavailability may occur as a result of the item being
repaired or it may occur as a result of undetected malfunc-
tions.
If records are maintained in an operating system, availability
and unavailability may be simply determined from the following
equations:
Availability = Up TimeUp Time + Down Time
Unavailability = Time + D own Time
It should be noticed that both measures are actually time-depen-
dent functions. However, it can be shown that after several
cycles of testing and repair both, availability and unavailability
approach a long-term asymptotic value which is time invariant.
It is this time invariant value which is mostly used as an approxi-
mation for calculational purposes.
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Some of the failures that occur in systems annunciate
themselves, and any repair process may start immediately. How-
ever, in standby systems failures are not self-annunciating and
can be discovered only by periodic testing. This way, the down
time is a strong function of the test interval, test time as
well as repair time. As a result, the test interval is one of
the most important parameters that can be readily adjusted to
parametrically study the predicted unavailability of a system.
As will be shown later, it is also the test strategy among
redundant systems which also plays a major role.
It should be recognized right from the outset, that although
the test interval may be adjustable seemingly at will it is
limited to the following constraints [1].
a) Wearout: The frequency of tests should be limited such
that wearout does not become the dominant cause of failure.
b) Test Duration: If the system is out of service while
undergoing a test, then the tests should not be done too fre-
quently, since the unavailability due to testing may become
as high or even higher than that due to random failures.
c) Fatigue: There is no incentive to test for failures due
to fatigue if all the fatigue is induced by the tests them-
selves.
d) Judgement: The designer would do well to apply good judgement
and not to design a system wherein an extremely short
test interval is necessary or one wherein an extremely long
test interval is allowed.
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It is especially the last point which will be illuminated for
typical standby systems of nuclear reactor power plant in what
follows. Thus, it will be tried to quantify the engineering judge-
ment related to test interval apportionments within the limita-
tions set forth in the available analytical and computational
tools.
It must be stressed that none of the analytical and compu-
tational procedures used in this study is able to simulate con-
tinuously distributed parameters. Therefore, questions related
to wearout and fatigue cannot and will not be addressed in what
follows. This is certainly one of the shortcomings encountered
by using any method which is solely based upon systemsuccess or
system failure and does not account for partial failure or degra-
dation effects. Therefore, in areas or procedure where wearout
effects may play an important role, engineering judgement is still
needed in its qualitative capacity because it cannot be quanti-
fied. It is important to comprehend this limitation because
at the same time it is the explanation for unresolved problems
with respect to the results provided by this study.
Recently methods have been developed for determing test
intervals for certain simple systems such as the "one-out-of-
two" system, "two-out-of-three" system and "two-out-of-four"
system [2]. The test interval for each component is such that
the system will meet system availability goals assuming that
unavailability due to failure equals that due to testing. These
test intervals may not yield a minimum for system unavailability
which is desirable.
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The availability of a single component affects the overall
system availability but it is not true that the optimum test
interval for a single component is the same as the optimum test
interval for that component when it is an integrated part of a
complex system. The purpose of this study is to determine the
optimum test interval for a system's components such that the
system's unavailability is minimized.
The availability is a function of many parameters. One
of the most general models was developed by Coleman and Abrams
[3]. This model allows for imperfect testing, failure due to
testing along with differentiating between test time and repair
time. Jacobs [4] derived a very simple formula for calculating
the optimum test interval for a single component. The methods
of Hirsch, Jacobs, and Coleman and Abrams will be used to check
the applicability of their methods for determining the optimum
test intervals that minimize system availability.
For the purpose of calculating the pointwise and mean system
unavailabilities as a function of the component test intervals
the computer code, FRANTIC [5], will be used. This computer
code has the capabilities of determining the system unavailability
as a complex function of component parameters. The effect of
staggering component tests is also a capability of the code.
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2. REVIEW OF ANALYTICAL METHODS AND COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS FOR
TEST INTERVAL OPTIMIZATION
2.1 Introduction
Many safety systems are standby systems. Therefore they
remain idle during their expected lifetime. There is a certain
possibility that the equipment, particularly passive components
in these systems, may fail prior to demand and make the system
inoperable. Critical standby systems, such as engineered safe-
guard systems in nuclear reactor plants, are therefore tested
periodically to decrease the likelihood that the equipment will
be unavailable upon demand.
If active components are tested frequently and maintained,
it is reasonable to assume that their failure rate remains con-
stant during the system mission time.
The following factors contribute to the system unavailability:
1) The possible existence of undetected failures for some
period of time caused by either human or hardware related
events;
2) The system downtime due to scheduled maintenance or testing.
Table 2.1 summarizes Vesely's [6] compilation of the relative
contribution of the hardware, test and maintenance and human
errors to the system unavailability. It should be noticed that
the contributions listed in the individual columns do not add
to 100% because failure causes, such as the combination of human
errors and hardware fialures, are not included. As the table
depicts, the various Engineered Safeguard Systems are
-11-
TABLE 2.1 Contribution to System Unavailability for Various
Engineered Safeguard Systems [6]
System
Low pressure recircu-
lation system
Sodium hydroxide
system
Safety injection
control system
Low pressure injec-
tion system
Consequence limiting
control system
Containment
leakage
Reactor
protection
Hardware
14%
51%
15%
65%
44%
Test &
Maintenance
75%
38%
20%
33%
Human
47%
18%
53%
91%
I
'I
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subject to fairly different impacts upon their unavailabilities
by the four contributors. Specifically, the sodium hydroxide
system shows a remarkable sensitivity to test and maintenance
procedures.
2.2 Mathematical Models
Neglecting the human error effects, availability model
calculations fall into three general classifications depending
upon the relative importance of the repair and test interval.
1) In case the mean time to repair is short compared to the
test interval, it can be shown that the effect of the
repair rate may be neglected. Thus, the availability
calculation is solely based on failure rates and test
intervals. This approximation may work well for systems
which are tested manually once every week, for instance.
For a single system, the availability, A, can be calcu-
lated from
A =T2 - (XT2 )(T2/2) (2.1)
T2
where T2 is the average time per test interval and A
is the constant failure rate characteristic of the exponen-
tial distribution. Using the following assumptions
a) AT2 << 1
b) The system is known to be in a working state at the
beginning of each test.
c) Every test interval has a test duration time of T2.
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d) Failure is only detected when the system is tested.
e) If a failure has been detected at the end of a test
interval, the system is renewed either by repair or
replacement.
Eq. (1) reduced to
XT 2
A = 1 2 (2.2)
for the availability and gives for the unavailability
T2
X 2 (2.3)
This approximation has been used for accounting for periodic
testing in the Reactor Safety Study - WASH 1400 [7].
2) In case the mean time to repair is very long compared to
T2, the test interval may be neglected. Thus the avail-
ability calculation can be solely based upon the failure
and repair rates. For this approximation, the availability
and unavailability are given by
A = 1 - Tr (2.4)
and
A = Tr (2.5)
respectively. The underlying assumption may be valid for
systems which are automatically tested on a very short period.
Here, Tr is the mean time to repair. The approximation
is valid provided XTr << 1 and the time-to-repair process
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is exponentially distributed.
3) For the situation where mean time to repair is of the same
general order of magnitude as the test interval, the accurate
determination of the availability becomes more difficult.
By assuming that the time it will take to test and repair
or renew the system is on the average Tr and that failure
cannot occur during testing, then the availability is given by
1 e- AT2
A X(T2 + Tr) (2.6)
provided that the failure is exponentially distributed.
From Eq. (2.6) the optimum test interval can be determined as
T2 = r (2.7)
Naturally, for systems consisting of several subsystems and
components, the failure distribution is determined by the indi-
vidual distributions as well as the logical interconnections
between them.
Engineered Safeguard Systems most often work in some sort
of redundancy for safety reasons. In redundant systems a failure
can be detected only when the system is tested. This test can
be conducted in either of two ways. During simultaneous testing
all the components are tested consecutively whereas in staggered
tests the components are tested at different times and as a result,
the components or subsystems have been in operation for different
times at any instant of time. It is obvious that by planning
to test at certain times one can increase the availability of the
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system. The objective then is to estimate the availability
of the system under a given policy and to select the best test
interval and/or repair time according to some criterion. This
approach is widely used and various aspects of it are discussed
in [8]. Green and Bourne [9] give the unavailability for some
redundant configurations due to undetected failures of the system
for simultaneous and symmetrically staggered testing. Their
results indicate that the unavailability is always greater or
just equal for a uniformly staggered test than for a simultaneous
test for any configuration.
The foregoing discussion was confined to estimate the effects
of testing and renewal on the availability of the system. It
should be noticed that these results may be used to choose T2
and Tr such that a predeterminined availability can be achieved.
Hirsch [2] used the criterion that during testing and repair
the unavailability of the system should be equal to its unavaila-
bility during normal operation. Presentation of other general
models can be found in References [9-12]. A general model which
allows for imperfect test distinction between testing time and
repair time and failure during test was developed by Coleman
and Abrams [3] who made the following assumptions:
a) The system fails according to the exponential distribu-
tion
b) Test is performed every T2 units of time
c) Inspection takes Tc units of time
d) The probability that a failure will be detected is 
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e) The probability of a false alarm is a
f) Inspection introduces stresses on the system and the
probability that the system will fail during the check-
out period is 
g) The probability that the failure, which occurs during
the checkout period, occurs before the actual testing
is K
h) If a failure is detected the duration of repair is
on the average TR
Under these assumptions the availability of the system is found
to be
e(1 - e- XT2)
( T2+Tc){l+e 'KT2[B(1-m+aK-K)-(1-e}+8lTR[1-(l-)(1-a)e R T 2] (2.8)
In case that the system cannot fail during the test (=0) and
if no false alarm is possible (a=O), than A is given by
)t(T2+TA =l (1 - e- T2)
X(T2+Tc)[1-e- eT2(1-)] + XTR(1-e-T2)j (2.9)
If in case the detection of failure is perfect, i.e. = 1,
this equation reduces further to
A = 1 - e-XT2
X[T2 + Tc + TR(1 - e-kT2)] (2.10)
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which can be compared to Eq.(2.6). It turns out that both equa-
tions are similar with the exception that in Eq.(2.6)the test
duration time and the repair time are lumped together into the
constant Tr whereas Eq.(2.10)treats these terms separately and
the time for repair is additionally multiplied by the probability
of the system being unavailable at the end of T2.
2.3 General Review
It should be noticed that Eq. (2.8) seems to cover quite
a broad spectrum of possible events during testing. Thus, it
will serve as the starting point of the analytical efforts in the
course of this research. However, it should be recognized that
this model does not account for the effect of human errors and has
not been extended yet to treat redundant systems. The former
effect has been examined recently by Apostolakis and Bansal [13]
who developed a set of equations for the commonly used redundant
configurations by using the model of coupling of successive human
actions as developed by Young and Conradi [14] for use in WASH-
1400.
Dressier and Spindler [15,16] presented a self-consisting
study concerning the effects of test and repair strategies on
reactor safety for commonly used logic configurations. However,
they neglected the impact of human error. Their results show
that the effect of repair times on the mean unavailability is
usually negligible for cold-standby systems which supports the
approximation used in the aformentioned category 1.
-18-
Although the literature on reliability theory is filled
with methods for optimally designing multi-component systems
subject to various constraints, very little is indeed available
on methods for optimally testing such systems. It is obvious
that in terms of the unavailability of a single system there must
exist a minimum as function of test frequency, test duration,
failure and repair rate. The existence of this minimum has been
demonstrated by Kontoleon et al. [17] who imposed additional cost
constraints upon the system which was subject to both partial
and catastrophic type of failures. Problems of this type call
upon the use of the Markovian process, continuous in time with
three discrete states. This approach was already used by Flehinger
[12] who examined the effect of marginal testing in 1962.
If the system consists of several components, some com-
ponents are probably tested more often than others because of
their reliability, cost of testing, or importance in the system.
Mastran [18] provides Bayesian decision rules for testing compo-
nents sequentially to minimize the sum of the cost of testing.
Another approach is to minimize, for instance, the impact
to the system unavailabilityby human error [13] or to divide
the unavailability goal equally between the test interval and
test duration [13]. The latter approach actually was devised
by Hirsch [2]. It allows to calculate both the testing interval
and the allowable repair time T.
In summary, it is believed that the literature provides
some interesting and promising concepts which can be used as
-19-
starting points for the analytical search of optimal testing stra-
tegies provided that the quantities and their distributions which
enter these formulations are known for the systems under considera-
tion. In what follows advantage will be taken of these formu-
lations for the present study.
2.4 Jacobs' Solution to the Test Interval Optimization
2.4.1 Formulation
Jacob's [ 4] solution procedure start out by considering
one cycle of test interval as shown in Fig. 2.1.
The availability of the system is defined as the probability
that the system is operational at any future time. The probability
that the system is up can be given in terms of conditional pro-
babilities as
P(S) = P(SJA) P(A) + P(SJB) P(B) (2.11)
where
P(S) : probability that the system is operational
P(SIA) : conditional probability that the system is up,
given that the random point in future time falls
into the time domain designated as A
P(A) : probability that the random point in future time
falls into A
P(SIB) : conditional probability that the system is up,
given that the random point in future time falls
into the time domain designated as 
P(B) : probability that the random point in future
time falls into B
-20-
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Figure 2.1: One Cycle of Test Interval
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It is apparent from the foregoing discussion, that P(SIB)
zero because the system is known to be completely inoperative
during test, i.e.
P(SIB) = 0
P(A) can be derived as
-T
T
2
P(A)
because all times are equally probable.
P(SIA) is taken to be the average reliability over the interval,
i.e.
1
P(S IA)
x(T - ?r)
0
which yields
= 1 ., [
X (T2-T r )
after substituting Eqs. (2.12), (2.13) and (2.15) into Eq.
one obtains for P(S)
P(S) = X1 [1-e-X(T2
r
As a result, the availability of the system is a function of the
three parameters X,T2, and T .r
is
(2.12)
(2.13)
T2-Tr
e-Xxdx (2.14)
P(S IA) (2.15)
(2.11)
- Tr)]
r (2.16)
1-e-X (T2 -.. Tr I
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2.4.2 Test Interval Optimization
In order to derive analytically the optimum , one has to
assume that the other two parameters, A and t are known and fixed
constants of the system. Then, by differentiating Eq. (2.16)
with respect to T2 and by setting this equal to zero, one obtains
dP(S) = 1dP(S) = 1 e- (T2Tr) (1 + AT T = 0 (2.17)aTXT' 2T2 AT2 2
which is a transcendental equation not readily solvable in an
explicit manner for T2. However, Eq. (2.17) can be brought into
the following form
-XT2 + ATeA2 = e-Xr (2.18)
e 2 2e 2
which is an exact equivalent of Eq. (2.17). Eq. (2.18) can be
solved explicity for T2 if the exponential terms are approximated by
2 3 
e = 1 + x + 3! + (2.19)e =lx-3!
By neglecting terms higher than second order yields
T2TT2 =12T (1 - T-r) (2.20)2 = 2( 2
Generally, >> t, so that with little error
2 (2.21)
2 , A
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With respect to the various approximations introduced into the
last equations, Eq. (2.21) is an approximate solution for T2.
The ATr vs. AT2 curve derived from Eq. (2.21) and labeled "Approximate
Solution" is compared to the "Exact Solution" in Fig. 2.2. As
can be seen it compares very favorably to the latter as long as
AT2 <0.1. For T2 = al the error amounts to 6.7% However, for most
technical problems and their respective values for , Tr and T2
the approximate solution for T2 given by Eq. (2.21) can be considered
adequate.
2.5 Discussion of Jacobs' Result
As already indicated in the introduction, Jacobs' result
applies directly to any nonredundant system. However, as Jacobs
noticed, the result can be used euqally well to any redundant
system in which the level of redundancy is reduced during the
test. If for instance in a one-out-of-two system, one channel
is bypassed for test, it becomes a l-out-of-l system, and safety
is impaired for the test duration. The availability is highest
when the availability of each channel in any 1-out-of-n system is
the highest, such that the results can be applied to each inde-
pendently.
It should be noticed however, that for a majority logic,
for instance a 2-out-of-3 system, the test usually results in
a -out-of-2 system for which the Eq.(2.11)does not apply. With
the solution of Eq.(2.11)on hand, it must be recognized that it
010-I
XT r
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Figure 2.2: Plot of XT vs. XT 2
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is not conservative to formulate the test interval on the assump-
tion of a higher than expected failure rate. Moreover, once this
test interval is properly formulated, it is not conservative to
test more frequently. These are the most important conclusions
which result from the study so far.
Fig. 2.3 illustrates the effect of testing on system avail-
ability. In the upper part, a, of the figure, the system is tested
once each T1 hours as compared to the lower part, b, of the figure,
where the system is tested every 2 hours, with 2< T1. The
test requires t hours where the system is rendered inoperable.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the system may fail with a con-
stant failure rate, X and the availability is perfect (unity)
immediately following a test but decreases exponentially until
the next test. For the duration of the test, the availability
is essentially zero (unavailability is unity).
By comparing both parts of Fig. 2.3, it becomes apparent
that in part b the availability degrades along the same curve
as in part a due to the same failure rate assumption. However,
due to the shorter test interval the curve does not reach as low
a level as in part a.
Under the extreme condition, that the interval between
tests is decreased until it is equal to the testing time, T
the system would be on test all the time and its'availability
would be clearly zero. On the other hand, if the interval between
the tests is made extremely long, the system would degrade down
-26-
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Test Interval on Availability
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to a very low level of availability. Intuitively then, it can
be expected that there may be a test interval that is optimum
for a given system failure rate, characteristic of the whole system,
and test duration that maximizes availability thereby minimizing
unavailability.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the aforementioned
ideas are only valid for a system which can be treated as one
component characterized by a constant failure rate, constant
testing time and where applicable constant repair rate. How-
ever, most technical systems and especially engineered safety
systems are multi-component systems and are characterized by
redundancy. Most of these components may display failure rates,
test times and repair rates ranging over a broad spectrum. Under
these circumstances, the considerations performed above do not
hold, and it should be recognized that there is no analytical
procedure available to optimize multi-component system avail-
ability
As a result and in view of the goals of this research, two
conclusions can be drawn
a) If there are sufficient data available which allow
to characterize uniquely a total system, without
breaking it down to sub-system or even component
levels, then, analytical procedures exist which
allow the determination of an optimum test interval.
b) No analytical procedure for test interval optimization
-28-
exist for systems which are characterized by redundancy
and sub-systems or components whose reliability para-
meters vary over a broad range, and when no sufficient
data base exists to characterize those systems uniquely
by failure rate, testing time, test interval and repair
rate. Under these circumstances complicated computer
codes must be used on a trial-and-error basis.
Accordingly, this research has to focus on both approaches.
-29-
2.6 Fault Tree Analysis and Evaluation
Because use will be made of the features of the fault tree
analysis later in this report it seems to be appropriate here
to outline some of its underlying principles.
Fault tree analysis is a formalized deductive analysis
technique that provides a systematic approach to investigating
the possible modes of occurrence of a defined system state or
undesired event.
Undesired events are identified either by inductive analysis
as a preliminary hazard analysis or as a failure mode and effect
analysis.
The events are usually undesired system states that can
occur as a result of sub-system functional faults.
Fault tree analysis consists of two major steps:
1) The construction of the fault tree.
2) The evaluation of the fault tree.
It should be noticed that the evaluation of the fault tree
can be qualitative, quantitative, or both depending upon the scope
and extent of the analysis. This study calls for a qualitative
and quantitative analysis with major emphasis on the latter.
The objectives of a fault tree analysis are:
a) To identify systematically all possible occurrence of
a given undesired event.
b) To provide a clear and graphical record of the analytical
process.
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c) To construct a baseline for the evaluation of design
and procedural alternatives.
2.6.1 Fault Tree Construction
The construction of the fault tree necessitates a thorough
understanding of the system. The undesired event, called the
"top event" must be carefully defined. Furthermore, the limit
of resolution should be stated, potential system interfaces
identified and constraints of the analysis realized.
A fault tree is a deductive logic model that graphically
displays the various combinations of possible events, both fault
and normal occurring in a system that lead to the top event.
The term "event" denotes a dynamic change of state that occurs
to a system element. If the change of state is such that the
intended function of the particular element is not achieved or an
unintended function is achieved, the event is an abnormal system
function of fault event.
Fault events may be classified according to two types:
1) A system element fails to perform an intended function.
2) A system element performs an inadvertant function.
System elements include hardware, software, human and environmen-
tal conditions.
In order to apply Boolean logic in fault tree analysis,
the outcome of each event must exhibit two states only, the OFF
state and the ON state. This limits the application of fault
tree analysis to two-state systems. In fact multi-valued state
-31-
systems are difficult to handle with this technique.
More details about fault tree analysis can be found in special
reports such as for instance Vesely [19].
2.6.2 Evaluation of the Fault Tree
In view of the fact that the FRANTIC code is used in this
study, the fault tree will be qualitatively specified by a system
unavailability function which is input to the code as described
in the next section. The evaluation of the tree, specifically
the occurrence of the top event will use the time-dependent method-
ology which forms the mathematical basis of FRANTIC.
2.7 Computational Tool - The FRANTIC Code
2.7.1 Introduction
The FRANTIC computer code [5] evaluates the point and mean un-
availabilities for any general system model. Non-repairable com-
ponents, monitored components, and periodically tested components
are handled. This flexibility together with the fact that FRANTIC
has been devised and tested by NRC led to the selection of this
code as the appropriate computational tool for this analysis.
One of the more unique features of FRANTIC is the detailed, time
dependent modeling of periodic testing which includes the effects
of test downtimes, test overrides, detection inefficiencies, and
test-caused failures. With regard to these features, FRANTIC
has to be considered the most flexible tool in engineering unavail-
ability analysis. The exponential distribution is used for the
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component failures and equations are developed for the testing
and repair contributions. In addition, human errors and common
mode failures can be included by assigning an appropriate constant
probability for these contributions.
It should be noticed, that in order to accommodate the
various processes, FRANTIC uses a variety of mathematical approxi-
mations all of which add to the conservative character of the
calculations.
The only real drawback of FRANTIC is that it needs the system
unavailability equation of the system under consideration as input.
This formula expresses the system unavailability in terms of the
component unavailabilities and is obtained either from a block
diagram, event tree, or fault tree by using standard Boolean
techniques. This requires a certain in-depth knowledge of these
methods by the user. The functions needed for the systems studied
for this analysis were derived from the respective fault trees
of the systems. These trees will be discussed in detail in the
following chapters.
2.7.2 Summary of Mathematical Models for Various Types of Components
Handled by FRANTIC
Four types of components are handled by the FRANTIC code:
1) Constant unavailability components
2) Non-repairable components
3) Monitored components
4) Periodically tested components
-33-
In what follows, the unavailability equations as used by the code
are summarized:
1) Constant Unavailability Components
By definition, a constant unavailability component is charac-
terized by a per demand (or per cycle) unavailability which
is independent of time, i.e.
q = qd (2.22)
2) Non-repairable Components
A non-repairable component is one, if it fails, is not
repaired during plant operation
q(t) = 1 - t (2.23)(2.23)
q(t) = At
where is the constant component failure rate.
3) Monitored Components
A monitored component is one for which the failure is imme-
diately detected and repair is then begun. The detection
device can be any kind of signal
XTR
q =+RTR X (2.24)R XT R
where TR is the average (detection plus repair) time.
4) Periodically Tested Components
A periodically tested component is one for which tests are
performed at regular intervals. The failure of the component
is not detectable until the test is performed. For this
type of component, one has to account for the following
contributions:
a) Between test contribution:
q(t) = A(t - T) for Tc<T<T 2 (2.25)
b) Test contribution:
Cql = Pf + (1 - Pf) qo + (1 - Pf) (1 - q)Q (2.26)
c) Repair contribution:
q2 = Pf + (1 - Pf) Q + (1 - Pf) (1 - Q) 1/2 TR (2.27)
where
t = the time from the preceding test
T2 = Test interval
T, = test period
TR = Repair period
Pf = Probability of test-caused failure
Q = A (T2 - Tc) = between test failure probability
qo = test override unavailability
For the first test interval T1, the between test contribution
is modified to q(t) = At and Q changes to AT1. In case of
periodic detection inefficiencies, gets modified to
A (1 - p) and an undetected contribution q'is added, with
q = Xpt.
It should alsobe noticed, that human error and common mode
contributions can be handled. This is usually done by
using q = qd
Fig.2.4 illustrates the instantaneous unavailability benavior
as generated by FRANTIC with all three contributions included.
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The graph shows the familiar saw-tooth shape with the test and
repair plateaus given by ql and q2. It should be noticed, that
even though test and repair period Tc and TR are usually of short
duration, the contributions by ql and q2 can be important to the
peak and average unavailabilities.
The average unavailability is computed by FRANTIC as the
area of the time dependent instantaneous unavailability curve
divided by the total time interval, the latter being any interval
of interest, for instance one year. Thus, by considering Fig.2.4
and taking T2 to be the cycle time (neglecting the effect of the
different first test interval T1, because it is usually small)
the average unavailability q can be approximately given as:
- 2 1T 2 + ql Tc + q2 TR2 X T2 T_ (2.28)
where the first term on the right hand side constitutes the between
tests contribution, the second term is the test contribution and
the third term is the repair contribution.
It is obvious -from the foregoing discussion that
FRANTIC not only provides average values for the unavailability
but also its total time dependent behavior. Therefore, in what
follows, both the average as well as the peak unavailabilities
will be reported for the systems under consideration. The peak
unavailability is a good indicator for the increase in system
unavailability no matter how short the test period is. Thus,
it is an additional parameter of interest for system design,
although it should be recognized that only the average unavailability
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of systems has been considered in the relevant literature (WASH-
1400).
2.8 Connection Between FRANTIC-Methodology and WASH-1400
It is certainly interesting to show how the aforementioned
methodology compares with that used by the Reactor Safety Study.
The following arguments follow these given by Vesely and Goldberg
[5].
In WASH-1 400, the system unavailabilities were calculated
in order to predict the accident sequence probabilities and then
the corresponding accident risks.
The system unavailabilities which were applicable for the
WASH-1400 predictions were the average unavailabilities, averaged
over a one year time period.
In addition to the average unavailability, the time depen-
dent, instantaneous unavailability can also be important in pro-
babilistic evaluations as discussed in the foregoing section.
T
=T q(t)dt where T = 1 year (2.29)
By definition the instantaneous unavailability q(t) is the pro-
bability that the system is unavailable at the given instant of
time t. The q is the average fraction of time that the system
is down.
To illustrate the roles of q and q(t) in probabilistic
analysis consider a particular accident sequence consisting of
-38-
one initiating event and one system which is called upon to
operate. Let A be the constant occurrence rate for the initiating
event. The probability f(t)dt that the accident sequence will
occur in some time interval dt at time t is:
f(t)dt = Aq(t)dt (2.30)
and hence Aq(t) is the instantaneous accident frequency, i.e.,
the probability of an accident occurring per time at time t.
The yearly accident frequency P, which is what WASH-1400
considered is the integral of q(t)dt over a one year period T.
p = Aq(t)dt = AT | q(t)dt (2.31)
O0
or
P = ATq (2.32)
Thus from Eq.(2.30)the instantaneous unavailability q(t) enters
into the instantaneous accident frequency rate Aq(t) and from
Eq.(2.32)the average unavailability q enters into the yearly
accident probability ATq.
The instantaneous accident frequency Aq(t) describes the
detailed time behavior of the accident. likelihood. The time
at which Aq(t) is a maximum, i.e., the time at which the instan-
taneous system unavailability q(t) is a maximum, is the time
at which the accident is most likely to occur. A safety system
-39-
may have a low average unavailability q and yet at particular
times the instantaneous unavailability q(t) may be quite high
indicating the plant is most vulnerable to accidents at these
times.
Fig. 2.5 compares two systems which have the same average
unavailability but show quite different instantaneous unavail-
ability behaviors. Certainly, the system with the highest unavail-
ability maxima in q(t) is the more loosely controlled system. Thus
it becomes apparent that for a more complete evaluation of system
design or system operation, both
a) the instantaneous unavailability, particularly the maxima
and
b) the average unavailability q
should be assessed. Because FRANTIC is providing these informations,
they will be both displayed for each system to be studied in
what follows.
2.9 Benchmark Tests of the FRANTIC Code Against the REBIT Code
2.9.1 Introduction
Because FRANTIC will be heavily used later in this study
and due to the fact that NRC upon releasing this code has not
provided the general public with any information as to how this
code compares to others, it seems to be appropriate to perform
benchmark tests with the code before it is employed. For this purpose,
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FRANTIC results will be compared to those obtained by the REBIT
[20] and the PL-MODT [21] codes for simple systems.
The code REBIT [201 (REliability by BIT handling) is a
small but powerful computer code ( 350 statements) written in
FORTRAN-IV language which determines the minimal cut sets of
a fault tree by Boolean expressions using convenient bit-handling
techniques and calculates various reliability and availability
characteristics by employing analytical techniques. The limitation
in the size of fault tress which can be analyzed by REBIT is
primarily dependent on the dimensions of the arrays. In its pre-
sent version the code can be considered as an interesting alterna-
tive to much more complex and time-consuming codes for treating
small to medium sized fault trees. It is of special importance
to those users who have no access to a PL/1 compiler to run PL-
MODT [ 21,22]. In contrast to the FRANTIC code [5 1, REBIT accepts
a fault tree as input, determines the minimal cut sets for the
system under consideration and continues by calculating the unavail-
ability, the cumulative failure probability and other relevant
data for both the minimal cut sets and the system.
2.9.2 Classes of Components Treated by REBIT
In its present version, REBIT is set up to handle components of
the following classes. Below,each class is shown with its asso-
ciated analytical expression for the component unavailability.
1. Periodically maintained components
-42-
= 1 - exp [- A(t - nTn)]
2. Non-repairable components
A = 1 - exp (- Xt)
3. Repairable components
2A =[1 - exp [-( A+p )t]]
Where
X A component failure rate
Tn: component maintenance interval
n : n-th maintenance interval
p : component repair rate
REBIT determines the point unavailability for the minimal
cut sets and the system every At hours for a prespecified number
of time increments. Both quantities are given as inputs. It
should be noticed that the time step size primarily determines
the accuracy of the calculation for the mean unavailability as
well as the magnitude of the peak unavailabilities. The effect
of this variable upon the calculated results will be discussed
in the following section.
REBIT uses the following expression for calculating the mean
unavailability Amean
n
A i Z A(j At) n: number of time increments.
mean n j=lj=l
-43-
2.9.3 Comparison of Results Between REBIT and FRANTIC for Two
Sample Problems
Due to the fact that REBIT does not handle periodically
inspected components at present, the approach which has been
taken in REBIT to compare it with FRANTIC has been to approxi-
mate periodically tested components by periodically maintained
components. To clarify this difference, a periodically main-
tained component has zero testing time and zero repair time,
that is, the component is instantaneously renewed at each main-
tenance. To perform an honest comparison the appropriate para-
meters have been set equal to zero in FRANTIC in order to give
the best simulation in the component models used by both codes.
The results for a parallelsystem of two components and a
3-out-of-4 gate are summarized in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 , res-
pectively. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 compare the point unavaila-
bilities obtained by both codes for the two sample cases, respec-
tively. The results shown for the REBIT calculations are those
for the larger time increments.
As can be seen from Figure 2.6 and Table 2.2, both codes
are in general agreement for the peak system unavailabilties and
the mean system unavailability. The agreement becomes even
closer for the case where REBIT was run with the smaller time
increment. Fig. 2.6 clearly indicates that the first term
approximation for the exponential distribution employed by
FRANTIC gives very reasonable results. For all practical pur-
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REBIT
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REBIT 100 Time Steps
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FIGURE 2.6:
TIME-DEPENDENT UNAVAILABILITY OF A TWO-COMPONENT
PARALLEL SYSTEM AS CALCULATED BY FRANTIC AND REBIT
TIME (HR)
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poses the comparison with REBIT shows a very satisfactory behavior
of the FRANTIC results.
For the 3/4 problem the two codes do not agree to the extent
that they did for the previous case. This is especially true
for the case where REBIT was run with the larger time increment.
For this case, REBIT obviously misses relative minima and maxima
which are calculated by FRANTIC. This deviation is mainly caused
by the time step size and partly by the maintenance times selected
for the components. With respect to the mean system unavailability,
Table 2.3 reveals that the results of the two codes agree only
in magnitude and that an increase in the number of time steps
from 100 to 1000 in REBIT has only little effect in bringing the
results closer to each other. FRANTIC is not supposed to give
precise answers either because it is based also on several approxi-
mations whose overall impact on the final results are difficult
to assess. The only way to decide what approach is closest to
reality would be to benchmark both codes against one employing
the Markovian approach.
As the complexity of the systems under study increases,
it can be expected that the agreement between the two codes will
greatly depend on the time increment chosen for REBIT and the
maintenance intervals selected for the components. Some disagree-
ment will always exist due to the fact that REBIT and FRANTIC
use different expressions for the unavailability of non-repair-
able components as shown below.
REBIT FRANTIC
A = l-exp (- At) A = At
Differences in A between these two expressions are certainly
small for At << 1. On the other hand, FRANTIC is limited by
its approximation since it can lead to unavailabilities greater
than one in certain cases.
Finally, it is of interest to compare the computation times
for both codes. These are given in the table below.
CPU Time in Minutes
This table reveals the interesting fact that FRANTIC although
it only obtains the unavailability for a given system unavailability
function is still slower than the REBIT code which generates both
the minimal cut sets as well as the unavailabilities. Further-
more, it is surprising to see that an increase in the number of
time steps from 100 to 1000 does not lead to a substantial increase
in computation time for REBIT which is certainly the result of
the benefit of using analytical expressions.
In conclusion, although the two examples do not constitute
a-complete basis, these results are the first published which
show how FRANTIC compares to other methods. A broader spectrum
of comparison is offered by PL-MODT and will be addressed in the
REBIT FRANTIC
100 time steps 1000 time steps 0.431
0.353 0.392
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following section.
2.10 Benchmark Tests of the FRANTIC Code Against the PL-MODT
Code
2.10.1 Introduction
The apparent advantages of modularizing fault trees rather
than taking the commonly employed cut-set approach nave been.
highlighted by the recent development of the code PL-MOD [22 ]
which uses the list processing features provided by the PL/1
language. This code is limited to the analysis of steady-state
problems.
In the meantime, analytical models have been added to PL-MOD
which allow the analysis of time-dependent problems and still main-
tain the advantages of modularization. Thus, a new version of
the code, PL-MODT, has been devised which still uses the unaltered
scheme for finding the modular structure and importances of the
fault tree. The following three classes
Class 1: Nonrepairable components
Class 2: Repairable components, failures of which are
detected immediately
Class 3: Repairable components, failures of which are
detected upon inspection.
The latter class includes the treatment of test override unavail-
abilities. Additional features of PL-MODT are the calculation
i)f the Vesely-Fussell importance as function of time and the
possibility to arbitrarily refine the time mesh which is an impor-
tant feature for getting detailed representations of test ard
-51-
repair intervals. With all these features, PL-MODT is certainly
better suited to test FRANTIC's validity than REBIT. Thus, more
insight can be expected from a comparison of these two codes, which
adds to the observations described in the foregoing section.
2.10.2 Results for the Comparison Between FRANTIC and PL-MODT
Two examples have been run with both codes for illustrative
purposes. The first one concerns the special fault tree given
and analyzed by Vesely in his original paper [24] by PREP-KITT.
This fault tree is shown in Fig. 2.8 The data assigned to the
primary events in this fault tree are summarized in Table 2.4
below
TABLE 2.4
FAILURE AND REPAIR RATES FOR SAMPLE TREE IN FIGURE 2.8
Primary Failure Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A(hr-l)
2.6 x 10-6
2.6 x 10-6
2.6 x 10-6
3.5 x 10-5
3.5 x 10-5
3.5 x 10-5
5.0 x 10-6
5.0 x 10-6
8.0 x 10-6
8.0 x 10-6
1 (x hr10)
4.1 x 10-2
4.1 x 10-2
4.166 x 10-2
1.66 x 10-1
1.66 x 10-1
1.66 x 10- 1
0
0
0
0
-
-
-
Figure 2.8: Fault Tree Example Given by Vesely
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The results obtained from the various codes are shown in
Fig.2.9which indicates that all methods give essentially the same
asymptotic value for the unavailability. In fact, FRANTIC is
predicting only this value by neglecting the transient period
over the first 20 hrs. of system operation, whereas PL-MODT and
KITT are suited for handling even this transition period. Ob-
viously PL-MODT is closer to the exact solution than KITT. The
computation time for PL-MODT to analyze the tree and to calculate
the top event unavailability for 15 time steps is 0.62 seconds.
The solution which is called "exact" has been generated
by using the exact system function and the analytical unavail-
ability expression for a single component which is failing randomly
and gets repaired, which is derived from a Markovian model. The
reason for the small differences between PL-MODT and the "exact"
result lies in the fact that the former contains some approxima-
tions concerning the time-dependent behavior of moduler. However,
it becomes quite obvious from this figure that the modular approach
is in fact quite superior over the kinetic tree procedure employed
by KITT. On the other hand it should be honestly mentioned that
these differences show up only in the minute details, whereas
for engineering calculations the correct determination of the
asymptotic value is of most importance.
The second example concerns the simple electric system as
discussed by Lambert [25] and shown in Fig. 2.10. The purpose of
this system is to provide light by the bulb when the switch is
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Power
supply 2
Sample System for Mutually Exclusive Events
....~· . ... .. . .. . .
Figure 2. 10.
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Figure 2.11
9 10
Fault Tree for Sample System in Figure 2.10.
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is closed, the relay 1 contacts are closed and the contacts of
relay 2 (a normally closed relay) are opened. Should the contacts
of relay 1 open, the light will go out and the operator will imme-
diately open the switch which in turn causes the contacts of the
relay 2 to close which restores the light. The fault tree, with
the top event of "No Light" shown in Fig. 2.11 neglects operator
failures, wiring failures as well as secondary failures. Failure
rates, repair times and test periods for the various components
are summarized in Table 2.5. No replicated component or module
exists in the system. In order to enable FRANTIC to analyze this
system, its unavailability function must be developed and pro-
vided as input. This function was found to be
QS = {l.O-(l-Q(1)){l-[(l-Q(2))(1-Q(4))(1-Q(7)91-Q(8))*
* (1-Q(9))(l-Q(10))][1-(1-Q(3))(1-Q(6))(1-Q(5)))}
On the other hand, for PL-MODT the fault tree was directly inputted
and the code modularized the tree as follows:
Module #4: components 5, 6, and 3
Module #3: components 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 2
Module #2: modules 4 and 3
Module #1: component 1 and module 2
Fig. 2.12 compares the results of both codes for one complete
period of 28 days. As can be seen, the results are in close
agreement. Again, FRANTIC gives conservative results compared
to PL-MODT, primarily due to the comparatively high failure rates
-59-
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which have been selected as well as the straight line approach for
the exponential function employed by FRANTIC.
As can be seen from Fig. 2.13 both codes give essentially
the same results during the test time but differ during the repair
time because of the different procedures used in the codes. How-
ever, as discussed previously, these differences show up only during
a very brief period of time and therefore do not affect the over-
all results.
The CPU time for PL-MODT was 0.98 seconds for the modulariza-
tion and the evaluation of the unavailabilities of the components,
modules and the top event for 32 time steps as well as for the
determination of the importances for the components and modules.
For the same tree and data, FRANTIC needs 1.12 seconds for
the calculation of the system unavailability alone. It does not
provide any structural information about the fault tree.
2.11 Comments and Discussion
It has been demonstrated in the last two sections that
FRANTIC is in fact a reliable engineering tool for unavailability
calculations. The comparisons shown before are the first pub-
lished for FRANTIC. They show that the code can be safely applied
for this tudy and our finding support NRC views on FRANTIC as
recently indicated by Levine [26].
However, despite all of these favorable indications about
FRANTIC it should not be overlooked that it has the fundamental
-62-
drawback of needing the system unavailability equation as input.
The formulation of this equation mandates knowledge in Boolean
Algebra by the user even for smaller systems. Large and complex
systems are difficult to handle by FRANTIC. Despite this short-
coming, the following study is based on the application of FRANTIC
because this code is used now in the regulating process [26].
However, the foregoing remarks clearly indicate that FRANTIC can
only be applied to small systems. In order to overcome this
limitation, the code must be coupled to a minimal cut set generating
preprocessor such as PREP, WAM-CUT, etc., in future.
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3. TEST INTERVAL OPTIMIZATION STUDY FOR A DIESEL GENERATOR UNIT
3.1 Introduction
The diesel generator is one of the most vital subsystems of
the Emergency Power System. This chapter is concerned with the
optimization of the test interval for the D.G. by considering it as
one component which allows the application of the analytical
procedures discussed previously. One of the most general models
was developed by Coleman and Abrams [ 3 ]. Jacobs [ 4 1 neglected
the repair time contribution and derived a very simple formula
for calculating the optimum test interval which minimizes the
unavailability of a single component. Hirsch [ 2 1 extended this
analysis, whereas Vesely [ 5 1 simplified the model by Coleman
and Abrams.
In what follows, these four methods will be applied to
evaluate the optimum D.G. test interval,and possible differences
will be discussed.
3.2 Optimum Test' Interval Derived from the Coleman & Abrams
Procedure
These authors derived the following equation for the
unavailability of a single component under very broad and general
conditions
AT
= (l-e- T)
X(T+Tc ){l+e X [6(l-a+aPc-Pce)-(l-) ]}+XTR[1- ( )l- m(1-B - XT)
(3.1)
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where
A Component availability
X Component failure rate
8 Probability of the failure during a test period
T Testing period
c
TR Repair time period
a Probability of a false alarm
P Probability of failure occurring before actual test
c
of the failure occurs during testing period
a Probability that a failure will be detected
T Time between repair time of previous interval to the
next testing period as shown below
T2 Test interval
The various time periods are depicted in the sketch below.
Eq. (3.1) is a very good starting point for deriving formulations
for A under more simplified conditions. For instance, by assuming
.1) perfect testing, i.e.,9=l
2) no false alarm, a=O
3) Pc=l; =O
C
Eq. (3.1) reduces to
A = T-+ (3.2)
A (T+T c) + ATR[l-e ]
From the above sketch, it follows that
T2 = T + T + TR
from which
T = T2 - (Tc + TR)
This, together with
A= 1- A
for the unavailability, leads to the following formula
A =1- - eAT (3.3)
-XT
X(T2- TRe 
In order to find the optimum test interval, T2, which minimizes
Eq. (3.3) for the D.G. unit, a graphical procedure will be
applied. For the base case, the following data are selected.
T = 1.5 hrs
TR = 21 hrs
X= 3 x 10-5hr-1
Table 3.1 shows the behavior of A as a function of T2,
and Figure 3.1 displays this in a graphical form. The minimum
is found at
T2 = 14 days where Ami n = 1.0045 x 10
opt
For T2 = 52 days, the unavailability is A =x 10.9965 x 2 .
-65-
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TABLE 3.1
D.G. Unavailability A as Function of the Test nterval.,
T2, for T =1.5 hr.; TR=21 hr. and -=3xl0-5hr-1
c R
T2 AxlO
days -
5 1.7199
10 1.0699
15 1.0066
20 1.0694
25 1.1747
30 1.3127
35 1.4584
40 1.6117
50 1.9313
250 8.53
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3.2.1 Effect of the Failure Rate on the Optimum Test Interval
In this section, the effect of the failure rate, , of the
D.G. on the optimum test interval, T2 , is studied parametrically
opt
and shown in Table 3.2. This is the result of a series of
studies as described at the end of the foregoing section. As
can be seen from this table, a decrease in the constant failure
rate, , results in an increase in T2 and a decrease in the
opt
associated unavailability.
3.2.2 Effect of Test Caused Failure on the Otimum Test Interval
In this section, the additional effects of test caused failures
on T2 are studied, i.e., the assumptions of setting p=O and
P =1 are now relaxed. If, for instance, the following data are
chosen for these two parameters
= 102
P = 0.75
and substituted into Eq. (3.1), the following expression results
for the unavailability, A, under the assumptions that still
1) e= 1
2) c = 0
A = 1- -3.4)
X(T+Tc)[l+l (0.25)e- T] + ATR[1-0.999e XT
which can be further rewritten as
-AT1-e
= 1- l (- T3.5)
AT2+[A(T2-TR)x2.5xlO 3 - o.99ATR]eXT
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TABLE 3.2
Effect of the D.G. Failure Rate on the Optimum
Test Interval and Associated Unavailability
(T = 1.5 hr; TR = 21 hr)
Ax 106 T2 A x 10 2
opt
-1
hr days -
1 75 0.175
5 35 0.3973
10 24 0. 566
30 14 1.0045
42 12 1.2003
60 10 1.4257
1.9158100
-70-
Table 3.3 shows the behavior of A as a function of T2 for the data
previously selected for the base case. A direct comparison with
the results summarized in Table 3.1 reveals that by additionally
accounting for test caused failures, the unavailability increases
for a given test interval. As a net result, the optimum test
interval, T2 and the associated unavailability, Amin change to
opt
T2 = 15 days with Amin = 1.311 x 102
opt
T2 = 44 days with A = 1.9946 x 10-2
3.2. 3 Effect of Imperfect Testing
In this section, the assumption of perfect testing made in
the foregoing sections will be removed, i.e., will be changed
from unity to =0.95 for the purpose of this study. The other
parameters are kept the same. Still, the assumption of no false
alarm is kept, i.e., a=0. Table 3.4 shows the additional impact
of imperfect testing results in higher unavailabilities than by
assuming perfect testing. The optimum test interval and its
associated unavailability are
T2 = 14 days A = 1.4201 x 10- 2
opt
If an unavailability goal of A=2x10 should be maintained, a test
interval of Tmpare38 days (A = 2.009 x 0-2 ) mus t be chosen. This
must be compared to the 44 days which were found under the perfect
testing assumption in the foregoing section in order to see that im-
perfect testing necessitates shorter test intervals for any given
unavailability goal.
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TABLE 3.3
Effect of Test Caused Failure on the Test
Interval and Associated Unavailability
(X=3x10-5 hr-1; Tc =1.5 hr; TR=21 hr; =10-2; P=0.75; a=0; =1)
T2 A x l02
days
5 2.1704
10 1.4085
15 1.3111
20 1.357
25 1.4567
30 1.5825
35 1.7226
40 1.8714
50 2.184
250 8.7225
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TABLE 3.4
Effect of Imperfect Testing on the Test
Interval and Associated Unavailability
(X=3xlO0 5 hr-1; T =1.5 hr; TR=21 hr; =10 2; P =0.75; =0.95; a=0)
T2 Ax 10
days
5 2.25
10 1.50
15 1.4208
20 1.4389
25 1.6012
30 1.7444
35 1.9020
40 2.0681
50 2.4151
250 9.5445
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3.2.4 Effect of Changing the Probability for Failure During
the Test Period
In the foregoing sections, it was assumed that is equal
-2to =10 . In this section, how the results change when is
increased will be examined. Table 3.5 shows the results for the
unavailabilities as function of the test interval when is
increased by a factor of five to =5xlO - 2 , and when perfect
testing, =1, is assumed. Under these circumstances, the
optimum test interval and its associated minimum unavailability
increase to
T2 = 18 days and Ai n = 2.4854 x 1002
opt
As can be seen from this table, there is no way to keep the
unavailability goal of A=2xlO 2 because all values of A are
larger indeed.
The situation even worsens if the test is imperfect (=0.95)
as can-be seen from Table 3.6. Although the optimum test
interval is longer, the minimum unavailability is even higher, i.e.,
-2
T2 = 20 days and Ami n = 2.822 x 102
opt
A comparison with Table 3.4 for which was also assumed to be
6=0.95 reveals that an increase in has a remarkable effect on
the unavailabilities. If is even further increased, the
unavailability increases even more drastically.
-1Table 3.7 shows this very clearly where =10 . Although
again perfect testing (=1.0) is assumed, the larger results in
-7 4-
TABLE 3.5
Effect of a Change in f
(X=3x10-5; Tc=l.5 hr; TR=21 hr;
-2
B=5x10 ; P =0.75; =1; c=0)
T2 A x 10
days
5 3.9318
10 2.740
15 2.511
20 2.491
25 2.5497
30 2.6468
35 2.7652
40 2.8966
50 3.182
250 9.4876
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TABLE 3.6
Effects of a Change in and Imperfect Testing
(X=3xlO 5 hr- 1 ; T=1 5 hr; TR=21 hr;
B=5x10-2 ; Pc =0.75; =0.95; a=0)
2T2 A x 10
days
5 4.268
10 3.0 487
15 2.8293
20 2.822
25 2.8958
30 3.008
35 3.1417
40 3.2885
50 3.6047
250 10. 451
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TABLE 3.7
Effect of a Change in and Perfect Testing
(A=3xlO 5 hr - 1 ; T =1.5 hr; TR=21 hr;
-1 c R
S=10 ; P =0.75; e=l; =O)
2T2 Ax 102
days
5 6.045
10 4.357
15 3.9702
20 3.8719
25 3.887
30 3.9454
35 4.0378
40 4.1484
50 4.401
250 10.43
-77-
much higher unavailabilities than those summarized in Tables
3.5 and 3.6. For this case, the optimum test interval increases to
T2 = 22 days
opt
and the associated unavailability becomes
Amin = 3.8673 x 10 -2
The results of the study concerning the impact of the probability
of failure during testing are summarized in Figure 3.2 for
perfect testing. It can be clearly seen from the curves in
this figure that the value of plays a major role. In fact,
if increases, a given unavailability goal may not be reached
anymore no matter what test interval is chosen.
It becomes apparent from both Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that for
any given availability goal A A but A>A there existmin min
two test intervals, one which is shorter than T2 whereas the
opt
other is longer. Due to the fact that costs, manpower and
services are required for performing these tests and all of
these quantities certainly increase with the test frequency,
there seems to be a strong economic incentive to select the
longer test interval as long as the availability goal is met for
all possible conditions in nuclear plant life. Only if it is
absolutely mandatory to achieve the lowest unavailability
possible is it important to determine the optimum test interval.
-78-
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3.2.5 Fixed Availability Goal
For the diesel generator unit, an unavailability goal of
A=2x10- 2 is selected. This is the result from the survey
that has been performed on D.G. failures in U.S. nuclear power
plants during this research. Appendix A summarizes the findings
which generally agree with the review reported in [27 ].
It should be noticed that our results are obtained by
averaging over all different kinds of D.G. units by applying
point estimates. By using the exponential failure density
function, the mean availability was found to be A=0.9726,
with standard deviation of 0.0214. Therefore, the unavailability
goal of A=2x10 - 2 seems to be reasonable.
Table 3.8 shows the test interval which would assure keeping
the goal of A=2xlO - 2 as a function of the failure rate, . As
can be seen, the test interval can be substantially increased
if the failure rate can be reduced. The data of Table 3.8
are graphically represented in Figure 3.3.
From the discussions in the foregoing sections, the following
data were obtained for the test intervals which would maintain
-2
a given unavailability goal of A=2x10 .
a) X=3x10-5hr-1; T=1.5 hr; TR=21 hr
1) 0 = 1
2) a = 0
3) P =1 = 0
A = 1.9965 x 10T2 = 52 days
-80-
TABLE 3.8
Effect of Failure Rate on Test Interval to Assure
A Given Unavailability of A = 2 x 10-2
Ax 10 T A x 10
2
hr1 days
1 >365 2.00
5 335 2.0063
10 165 2.0007
30 52 1.9965
42 36 2.0061
60 23.5 2.0000
11 2.0098100
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b) X=3x10- 5 hr-1; T =1.5 hr; TR=21 hr; =10- 2; P=0.75
c ; R c
1) 0 = 1
2) a = O
T2 = 44 days
-2
A=1.9946 x 10
c) X=3x10 5 hr ; T=1.5 hr; TR=21 hr; =10 ; P=075; 6=0.95
1) a = 0
T2 = 38 days A = 2.0009 x 10-2
An increase in leads to unavailabilities which are larger than
-22x10 2 Therefore, under these conditions the unavailability
goal cannot be kept.
3.3 Optimum Test Interval Prediction Following Jacobs' Method
By assuming that the time it will take to test and repair
or renew the system is on the average T and that no failure
c
can occur during testing, Jacobs showed that the optimum test
interval can be approximately calculated from
opt
2opt I 2
when T2 < 0.1 (3.6)
as was demonstrated in the derivation presented in Chapter 2.4.
Table 3.9 summarizes the values for T2
opt
obtained from
Eq. (3.6) for T =1.5 hr for various failure rates. It should be
c
noticed that the data given for T2
opt
are rounded to the nearest
whole day since testing will be performed on this basis.
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TABLE 3.9
Optimum Test Interval Derived from Jacobs'
Formula as Function of the Failure Rate
(T = 1.5 hr)
X x 106
hr 1
,hr
1
5
10
30
42
60
T
2opt
days
72
32
23
13
11
9
2
A . x 10
min
0.173
0.386
0.545
0.943
1.114
1.33
1.713100 7
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By comparing these results with those given in Table 3.2
for the Coleman and Abrams Method, one can conclude that Eq. (3.6)
is indeed quite adequate for finding the optimum test interval
for straight base cases, although the neglection of the repair
time contribution by Jacobs leads to somewhat shorter test
intervals and lower minimum unavailabilities.
However, it should be noticed that Jacobs' results deviate
substantially when imperfect testing, long repair times, failure
during testing, etc., must be considered. However, for perfect
testing and TR=0, Jacobs' equation is a special case of Coleman
and Abrams' more general question.
3.4 Optimum Test Interval Prediction Following Hirsch's Method
Hirsch 2 ]1 developed a methodology for determining the maximum
allowable test duration and the required test interval as a function
of the availability design goal. He started out by noticing that
the availability design goal of a system which actually expresses
the probability that the system will be available when needed is
at the same time also a measure of the allowable downtime permitted.
Since a portion of the unavailability is due to the test duration
and another contribution is associated with the predicted probable
failures, the assigned unavailability goal is the sum of both
contributions, i.e.,
G = AF + ATF T (3.7)
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where
AF: unavailability due to failures during the active
part of the interval
AT : unavailability during test with part of the system
bypassed
In accordance with Section 4.11 of IEEE-279 [28 ], the system
unavailability during bypass must be commensurate with the
unavailability of the system for the entire interval if no
bypass were applied. Therefore, Hirsch set
AF =AF = AT (3.8)
and then developed formulas for the "one-out-of-two" logic and the
"one-out-of-two, twice" logic. In addition, the procedure was
extended to cover the "two-out-of-three" and "two-out-of-four"
logic configurations.
Here, the analysis is continued for a single component. With
T
_ c
T T2
(3.9)
AF = X(T2 - T )
one gets
T
X(T - T ) c
2 c T 2
from which the optimum test interval follows as
1 2 c +T = iT + T + -- ]
2 2 c c X
opt
and
(3.10[)
(3.11)
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With T chosen to be T =1.5 hr, Table 3.10 summarizes the results
C C
for T and their related minimum availabilities for different
opt
failure rates, A. A comparison with the previous data indicates
that the results obtained by Hirsch's method when applied to a
single component system differ substantially from those obtained
by using the Coleman and Abrams or Jacobs methodologies. The main
reason for this is thought to lie in the fact that Hirsch developed
his method for redundant systems whereas it was applied to a single
component here.
3.5 Optimum Test Interval Following Vesely's Method Implemented
into the FRANTIC-code
Because the FRANTIC code will be used extensively in the
next chapter for the analysis of the optimum test intervals of
redundant, multi-component systems, it seems to be appropriate to
see what method it uses and how it compares to the approaches
previously discussed for a single component system.
FRANTIC uses the common approximation to the exponential
function
x -Xe l-x
to arrive at the unavailability of a component between the tests
A = X(T2 - Tc )
where T is understood as the average on-line test time. Due to
c
the fact that the FRANTIC code considers both test as well as
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TABLE 3.10
Optimum Test Interval Derived from Hirsch's Method
as Function of the Failure Rate
(T = 1.5 hr)
c
T2
opt
days
51
23
16
9
8
7
2A x 10
min
0.1224
0.273
0.386
0.781
0.893
1. 04
X xlO 6
-1hr
1
5
10
30
42
60
6100
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repair contributions to the unavailabilities, two separate
expressions are used in the code, namely
for the unavailability during test time T :
ql Pf + (l-Pf)q0 + (1-Pf)(l-qo)A (3.12)
for the unavailability during repair time TR
q2 = Pf + (1-Pf)A + (1-Pf)(l-A)XTR (3.13)
where
Pf: probability of test caused failure
q: test override unavailability
The average unavailability of the component over a period
of one test interval is
1 Tc T R
q =T 2 + q c q (314)
2 2
by using the results for ql and q2 from Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13).
The optimum value of T2 is found by using Eqs. (3.12) through
(3.14) and performing
O( q 0 (3.15)
which leads to
o2T X + 2(1-Pf)TR (3.16)
opt
In this derivation, ql is assumed to be independent of T2
Moreover, a term by term comparison of the two terms under the
-89-
square root reveals that the second term is negligible for all
practical purposes unless the failure rate is abnormally high.
Therefore, by assuming Pf=l and qo=l, one obtains
T2 = X (3.17)
opt
because q=l. Eq. (3.17) shows that Vesely obtains the same
formula as Coleman and Abrams as well as Jacobs for the condition
stated above. Therefore, it seems to be unnecessary to perform
a great deal of additional calculations for Vesely's method.
The optimum test interval for the data of the base case is
T2 = 13 days
opt
and follows from Eq. (3.17) as well as Eq. (3.6). This compares
favorably with the value of 14 days obtained by using the
Coleman and Abrams approach as shown in Table 3.2.
3.6 Comparison of Different Methods for the Prediction of the
Optimum Test Interval
Figure 3.4 summarizes graphically the findings of this chapter
by comparing the optimum test interval as function of the failure
rate for the following three methods: Coleman and Abrams, Jaccbs,
and Hirsch. In this context, it should be remembered that the
method by Vesely gives the same values as presented by the line
generated by Jacobs' method if qo=l and perfect testing is
assumed.
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Figure 3.4 shows that the results by Coleman and Abrams and
those by Jacobs are very close to each other. The results obtained
from Hirsch's method deviate from the other two by giving two
short optimum test intervals as compared to the other methods.
For the data selected for the base case, A=3x10 5 hr - 1
T =1.5 hr, and TR=21 hr, the optimum test interval found in this
c R
study ranges from 13 to 15 days depending on the method applied.
-2This results in a minimum unavailability of 1.00x10 2
On the other hand, by selecting the unavailability goal of
2x10- 2, the test interval will increase to between 38 and 52 days
depending on the perfectness of the test.
Finally, it can be concluded that for most practical purposes
Jacobs' method gives reliable results for T2 as long as the
opt
circumstances validate its underlying assumptions. The expression
given by Coleman and Abrams offers the highest flexibility
when additional effects are to be studied and more accurate results
about the repair time effect are desired.
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4. STUDY OF THE OPTIMUM TEST INTERVAL FOR MULTICOMPONENT SYSTEMS
--EXAMPLE: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
4.1 Introduction and Aux-Feed-System Description
It was shown in the foregoing chapters that analytical
procedures for estimating the optimum test interval only exist
for single component systems. Although at least Hirsch's methodology
[ 2 1 allows consideration of redundant situations, his formulas
were developed only for redundant systems consisting of identical
components. Therefore, the expressions given by Hirsch are only
of limited usefulness for systems such as the Aux-Feed-System
which, in its most primitive representation is shown in Figure 4.1,
would consist of 2 D.G.s and a pump in parallel. This system can
be described as a one-out-of-three system, i.e., functioning of
any one of the three paths leads to system success. As Figure 4.1
shows, two paths require that one of the diesel generators functions
while the third mandates that both valves and the pump are
operational because they are in series.
From the very simple system configuration shown in Figure 4.1,
it is an easy task to develop the fault tree of the Aux-Feed-
System as depicted in Figure 4.2. The numbers in the fault tree
correspond to the component numbers of Figure 4.1. From the
fault tree the system logic function can be easily determined by
inspection. This function is needed as input to the FRANTIC code
because it does not have fault tree analysis capability. In terms
of the FRANTIC nomenclature, the system logic function is given by
-93-
Valve Pump Valve
1 3 2
Diesel Generator 4
Diesel Generator 5
Figure 4.1: Simplified Aux-Feed System
Unavailale
and
or
1 2 3 5
Figure 4.2: Fault Tree for the
Aux-Feed System
Simplified
- * _ F -
-
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QS = {1.0-[1.0 - QC(1) * [1.0 - QC(2)]
(4.1)
* [1 - QC(3)]} * [QC(4)] * [QC(5)]
where QS = system unavailability
QC(i) = unavailability of the ith component
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses correspond to the
component numbers in Figure 4.1.
It must be noticed that the unavailability of the i-th
component QC(i) is a function of many parameters, not only of
the component itself but also of the type of testing, effective-
ness of the test, and the probability of test caused failure.
Table 4.1 summarizes the input data to the FRANTIC code which
are kept constant during this study. Only the test interval and
the staggering times are varied.
Whereas most of the quantities in Table 4.1, such as failure
rate, average test time, and probability of a test caused failure
are self-explanatory, a few others need more clarification.
For example, the override unavailability refers to the probability
that the component, while being tested, cannot be switched back
to its safeguard function. A value of q=1 means that the
component cannot be used for its designed function while it is
being tested. The detection inefficiency is the probability for
a failure of a component's not being detected during the test.
In the FRANTIC code, this situation is treated by considering
the undetected failure rate as the product of the component
-95-
TABLE 4.1
Symbols and Typical Values Which Are
Used in FRANTIC Code
X - component failure rate (x 10- 6 hr - 1)
T2 - component test interval (days)
T1 - initial component test interval used for
staggering purpose (days)
T - testing time (hrs)
c
TR - repair time (hrs)
q0 - override unavailability
Pt - probability of test induced failure
p - undetermined failure rate (10- 6 hr- 1)
qd - residual unavailability
= .3
= 38 days
= 1.5
= 7.0
= 1.0
TOTAL UMEAN - Aux-Feed-System mean unavailability for 1-year period
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failure rate, , and the detection inefficiency, i.e.,
A = A p (4.2)
where
: undetected failure rate
X component failure rate
p : detection inefficiency
The objective of this study is to optimize the availability,
i.e., minimize the unavailability of the Aux-Feed-System by
finding the optimum tet intervals while keeping the other
components and testing characteristics constant as shown in
Table 4.1.
4.2 Strategies for the Optimization of Test Intervals
Procedures for determining the optimum test interval for
simple systems such as a single-component system or a two-
component parallel system were already discussed and used in
Chapter 3. As has been already indicated there, no analytical
methods exist at present which allow explicit determination of
the optimum test interval for large and complex systems.
Therefore, the methods of Hirsch, Jacobs, and Coleman and Abrams
are used again, this time to find the test intervals of the
components, while the resulting system mean unavailability is
determined by the FRANTIC code by using these test intervals as
input. These results will the be compared to those resulting from
an iterative search for the optimum test interval.
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The basis of all comparisons presented in what follows is
the system mean unavailability with due consideration given to
the peak unavailability during the period of interest which is one
year. Although it is acknowledged that the selection of test
intervals should be related to risk and consequences, the present
study is solely based on the mean and peak system unavailabilities.
4.3 Optimum Test Interval Determination for Components
4.3.1 Hirsch's Methodology
By using the availability design goals of the standard
IEEE-279 [28 ], Hirsch developed a method for determining test
intervals and allowable bypass time for several simple system
configurations as already discussed in Chapter 3. For the
purpose of the present study, the bypass (testing) time is
considered predetermined and only the testing interval needs to be
calculated. According to IEEE-279, the system unavailability
due to testing must be commensurate to the system unavailability
and is the sum of these two components as stated by Eq. (3.7 ).
When the bypass time is considered variable, both the bypass time
and the test interval are determined by the system configuration
(for example, one-out-of-two), component failure rates, and the
design goal. When the bypass time is given along with the
system configuration and component failure rates, the test
interval and system unavailability are determined.
-9 8-
Valve Pi-mp Valve
Turbine Pump Train
Diesel Gen tor 54
Figure 4.3: Subsystems of the Simplified
Aux-Feed System
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Unfortunately, Hirsch did not develop an expression for the
one-out-of-three type of configuration which is the main
characteristic of the Aux-Feed-System. However, in order to be
able to apply Hirsch's methodology despite the nonexistence of a
special expression for the one-out-of-three system, the Aux-Feed-
System is being broken down into two subsystems as shown in
Figure 4.3. One subsystem is the one-out-of-two diesel generator
subsystem; the other is the turbine pump chain. The analytical
method is applied as follows.
For the turbine pump chain, the system can be partitioned to
an equivalent subsystem describing this series. Since an
exponentially distributed failure has been assumed throughout
this analysis, the failure rate, , for this series system is the
sum of its component failure rates, i.e.,
E =A +X +X
E -v 1 v2 p
= (0.3 + 0.3 + 3.0) x 10 hr
= 3.6 x 10 hr (4.3)
The testing time, Tc, is assumed to be the same for all
components, i.e.,
T T = T = T = 1.5 hr (4.4)
c c 2c c
v1 v2 P
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Following the Hirsch method, T2 is found as
XET - XET )2 + 4 ETc
T = (4.5)
opt 2XE
With the data given above, T2 follows as
T2 = 646.25 hr = 27 days (4.6)
opt
For the diesel generator subsystem (one-out-of-two), one can
either consult the graphs supplied by Hirsch in 2 ] for the
determination of T2 or use the following exact expressions
opt
for perfect staggered testing among the diesel generators.
With
AF = ( ) (T2 (4.7)
AT = AT (4.8)
By satisfying Hirsch's requirement
AF = AT
one can solve for T2 which follows as
2
2 = ) l-AT (4.9)
With the data for the diesel generators taken as
-6 h-1
= 42 x 06 hr0) (4.10)
T = 1.5 hr
C
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one obtains
T2 = 414.04 hr = 17 days (4.11)
The testing of the diesel generators according to the perfect
staggered testing is shown on the time scale shown in Figure 4.4.
It should be noticed that the testing time of 1.5 hr is not shown
on this scale.
4.3.2 Jacobs' Methodology
For a single component, Jacobs has determined the optimum
test interval as a function of the failure rate, X, and testing
time, T . This test interval results in a minimum meanc
unavailability for the component. It will later be shown as
for the other cases, that this test interval for the component
differs from the test interval for the component when it is
considered part of the system which is minimized.
The equation below can be solved to find the optimum single
component test interval when both the failure rate and testing
time are given.
1 [eX (T2Tc)(l+T 2)] - = (4.12)
T2 AT2
This function is transcendental and is not quickly solved
without computer aid. Therefore, it is simplified according to
the assumption that,
AT <<1
c
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NOTE: Testing time is 1.5 Hrs. and is not shown on time scale.
Figure 4.4: Time Scale for Staggered Test Procedure
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to yield,
2T
T2 = / C (4.13)
This formula is quite simple in nature since it does not account
for the effects of repair time, test inefficiency, and other
contributors to the components' unavailability.
Using Eq. (4.13), the test intervals for the Aux-Feed-
System components are determined. It should be recalled that the
valves and pump of the system must be tested simultaneously
and, therefore, the equivalent failure rate, E) is used for this
part of the Aux-Feed-System. Table 4.2 below summarizes the
results.
TABLE 4.2: TEST INTERVAL CALCULATED USING JACOBS' METHODOLOGY
Component X(10-6 hr-l) T (hrs) T2 (days)
c
Diesel Generator 4 42 1.5 11
Diesel Generator 5 42 1.5 11
Pump Valve Chain 3.6 1.5 38
NOTE: The test interval, T, is rounded off to the nearest
whole day since testing will be on this basis.
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4.3.3 Coleman and Abrams Methodology
As discussed already in Chapter 3, these authors developed
the most comprehensive expression for the component availability.
For the present study, the following assumptions are made
= 0, i.e., system does not fail during test
a = 0, i.e., no false alarm
= 1, i.e., perfect testing
which simplify Eq. (3.1) to the following expression for the
availability
l-e-XT2
A (4.14)
X[T2+Tc+TR(1-e XT2)J
A= 1- A
By using Eq. (4.14), the unavailability A is calculated for each
component of the Aux-Feed-System.
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of these calculations for
all components for a series of test intervals. These unavaila-
bilities are plotted versus T2 in Figure 4.5 for the pump,
valves, and pump-valve chain, whereas Figure 4.6 shows A vs. T2
for the diesel generators. By noticing where the minima occur,
the test intervals for the diesels and the pump-valve chain are
determined. The pump-valve chain is used rather than the
individual components since they must be tested coincidentally.
Table 4.4 summarizes the resultant test intervals.
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TABLE 4.3
AUX-FEED-SYSTEM COMPONENT UNAVAILABILITIES AS A
FUNCTION OF TEST INTERVAL
Component
Test Interval (Days)
7
10
12
14
15
20
25
30
35
140
45
50
60
80
100
120
Pump
(10- 3)
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.3
3.7
4.3
Unavailability
Valve Pump Valve Chain
(10- 3) (10-3)
-- 4.9
-- 4.0
-- 3.6
2.2 3.4
1.9 3.35
1.7 3.34
1.6 3.4
1.14 3.5
1.3 3.7
1.1 4.3
.99 --
.95 --
Diesel
Generator
(10- 3)
1.32
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
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Coleman & Abrams Method
= 42 x 10-6
T = 1.5 hr
c
TR = 21 hr
I I I* 
20 30 40 50 6010
Test Interval (Days)
Figure 4.6: Aux-Feed-System -- Diesel Generator Unavailability
as a Function of Test Interval
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TABLE 4.4
OPTIMUM TEST INTERVALS CALCULATED USING
COLEMAN AND ABRAMS METHODOLOGY
Component (10-6 hr- 1 ) Tc TR T2c R 2
Diesel Generator
Pump-Valve Chain
42
3.6
1.5
1.5
21 12
17 38
The resultant test intervals for the components as computed
by using the methods of Hirsch, Jacobs, and Coleman and Abrams
are summarized below in Table 4.5.
TABLE 4.5
OPTIMUM COMPONENT TEST INTERVALS (DAYS)
Method
Component
Diesel Generator
Pump-Valve Chain
Hirsch
17
27
Jacobs
11
38
Coleman and Abrams
12
38
The methods of Jacobs and Coleman and Abrams agree quite
closely since the objective of these two methods is to optimize
the test interval versus the method of Hirsch which has as its
objective to meet an unavailability goal for the system. Hirsch's
method also uses the IEEE-279 requirement that unavailability
due to testing be equal to the unavailability due to failure.
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4.4 Determination of the System Unavailability by FRANTIC
The next step is to input these test intervals along with
the component and testing characteristics in to the FRANTIC code and
to calculate the resultant Aux-Feed-System unavailability.
The FRANTIC code does not compute or determine optimum test
intervals but rather determines the system unavailability due to
test intervals.
For redundant systems,staggering is used to prevent testing
the total system at one time, which results in the unavailability
being unity. The actual method of staggering itself can have
great effects on the system unavailability. Two methods of
staggering are used here to show the upper and lower bounds of
the Aux-Feed-System unavailability for each of the three methods
used to calculate test intervals. In FRANTIC, staggering is
handled by the input value of T1. T1 represents the first test
interval for that component while T2 is the test interval which
was calculated using the methods previously cited.
The first type of staggering used is the simultaneous method.
Since the diesels are tested on the same test basis, one diesel
should be tested before the other to avoid large unavailabilities
due to coincident testing. Therefore, simultaneous testing is
used. Simultaneous testing means that after one diesel has been
fully tested, the other diesel is tested immediately. To avoid
testing either diesel at the same time as the pump and valves, the
diesels must be staggered relative to the pump tests also. Because
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of this, T1 for diesel #4 is 0.063 days (1.5 hrs = Tc ) and T1
for diesel #5 is 0.13 days (3.0 hrs = 2T ). Simultaneous testing
yields an upper bound for system unavailability.
To determine the lower bound for the Aux-Feed-System unavaila-
bility, the method of perfect staggering is used. Since the
test intervals,T2, of the diesels are equal but are different
from the test interval of the pump and valves, perfect staggering
is applied to the diesels only. In perfect staggering, the first
test interval, T1, for one diesel is set equal to the actual
test interval, T2, divided by 2 since there are two diesel
generators. The resultant initial test interval, T1, for the
methods of Jacobs and Hirsch are not whole numbers but have
been rounded off to the nearest whole number of days. Again,
to alleviate any possibility of coincidentally testing either
diesel with the pump and valves, T1 for each diesel has been
offset by 0.063 days (T = 1.5 hrs).
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of the FRANTIC calcula-
tion,along with the inputs, for each of the three
methods of test interval determination. Table 4.6 gives the
results for simultaneous testing while Table 4.7 gives the
results for perfect staggering.
The nomenclature used in these tables is explained below:
AF: mean system unavailability due to failure
AT: mean system unavailability due to testing
AR: mean system unavailability due to repair
ATotal: total mean system unavailability
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TABLE 4.6
Unavailability Calculations by Using the FRANTIC Code
for the Aux-Feed-System, Simultaneous Testing
(qo=l; Pf=0; p=0; qd=O)
HIRSCH METHOD
Component # Xx10 6hr- 1 T2 day22da
1 Valve 0.3 27 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 27 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 27 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 17 0.063 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 17 0.13 1.5 21
otal -6 F -7 of ATl AT % of otal AR-6 % of otal
1.928x10 1.813x10 9.4 1.724x10 6 89.44 2.223x10 8 1.15
A Time Time between peakspeak 3
2.253x10 323 d varies
JACOBS METHOD
Component # x106hr- 1 T2 day T1 day T hr TR hr2 1 c- R
1 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 38 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 11 0.063 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 11 0.13 1.5 21
ATotal -6 of ATota A % ofotal R% of otal
3.408x10 9.915x10 2.91 3.29x10 6 96.56 1.816x10 8 0.53
A Time Time between peaks
peak 3
3.203x10 341 d 67 d 1st 4 peaks
COLEMAN AND ABRAMS METHOD
Component # XxlO hr T2 day T day T hr T hr2 1 c R
1 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 38 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 12 0.063 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 12 0.13 1.5 21
ATotal AF 7% of ATotal AT % of ATotal AR % of ATotal
3.34x10 1.182x10 3.54 3.198x10 6 95.84 2.066x10 8 0.62
Apeak Time Time between peaks3.307x 22peak8 d varies
3.307x10 228 d varies
T1 day T hrC TR hr
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TABLE 4.7
Unavailability Calculations by Using the FRANTIC Code for the
Aux-Feed-System, Perfect Staggered Testing
(qo=l; Pf=O; p=O; qd=0)
HIRSCH METHOD
Component # Xxl0 6hr- 1 T2 day22da T1 day T hrc TR hrR
1 Valve 0.3 27 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 27 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 27 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 17 0.083 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 17 8.080 1.5 21
otal 7 F -8 % of otal % f Total AR - % f ATotal
3.327x10 8.88x10 26.72 2.226x10 7 66.92 2.115x10 6.36
A Time Time between peaks
peak 4
1.743x10 324 d varies
JACOBS METHOD
Component # Xx10 hr T2 T day T1  hr TR hr
1 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
1 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 38 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 11 0.083 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 11 5.080 1.5 21
ATotal AF % of ATotal AT % of ATotal R of ATotal
2
.159x10-7 4.675x10 8 21.66 1.502x10 7 69.57 1.895x10- 8 8.78
A Time Time between peakspeak
7.943x10 342 d 38 d for peaks 2 through 7
COLEMAN AND ABRAMS METHOD
Component # %x10 hr- 1 T2 day T1 day T hr TR hr
1 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
2 Valve 0.3 38 1.5 7
3 Pump 3.0 38 1.5 19
4 Diesel 42 12 0.063 1.5 21
5 Diesel 42 12 6.060 1.5 21
ATotal F 8 ATota1 X % f of ATA of Total
2.463x10-7 5.605x10 22.75 1.693x10- 7 68.75 2.092x10-8 8.49
ApeA Time Time between peakspeak
7.164x10 114 d 114 d 1st 3 peaks
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From Tables 4.6 and 4.7 it is obvious that using the optimum
test interval as determined by the Jacobs method for perfect
staggered test results in the lowest total mean system
unavailability of all three methods applied. However, it will
be shown in the next section that this unavailability of
-7ATota = 2.159x10 is in fact not a minimum for the Aux-Feed-
System. Therefore, it must be concluded that optimum test
intervals stemming from single component expressions do not
necessarily result in a minimum system unavailability. Hence,
these test intervals are not truly optimum with respect
to the system as a whole.
Another observation which can be made by comparing these
tables is that perfectly staggered testing leads to mean and peak
unavailabilities which are by at least an order of magnitude lower
than those resulting from simultaneous tests.
4. 5 Optimization of the Test Interval by Iteration with FRANTIC
The FRANTIC code does not calculate the optimum test
interval for components of a system but rather calculates the
system and component mean unavailabilities for a given set of
component test intervals. Therefore, in searching for optimum
test intervals, various sets of test intervals for each component
of the system are systematically input, and FRANTIC outputs
the unavailabilities. By observing the output of FRANTIC, the
"best" test intervals are determined. These test intervals are
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those which yield the smallest system unavailability. It is
possible that these "best" test intervals are not optimum since
at this point there is no analytic means of checking.
In addition, there may be differences between the optimum
test interval and those test intervals which are implemented
at the plant itself due to scheduling problems. For example,
it would be rather difficult to schedule a six-day test interval.
Probably this test interval could be changed to a weekly basis
without great effect upon the system unavailability. Therefore,
the results of two different types of testing are included in this
section. The first is a result of testing on a basis without
consideration to ease of scheduling, i.e., a test interval of
13 days could result. The second set of test intervals are those
which could be scheduled relatively easily, i.e., weekly, biweekly,
etc. The results are shown graphically with explanation.
To find the optimum test interval, all components were tested
with equal test intervals on a perfect staggering basis. In
this case, the staggering dates were not rounded off to the
nearest whole day. Since there are three trains and all are
tested on an equal interval, the staggering time is:
T2 /3 = T1
The first diesel is tested after T1 days and the second diesel
is tested after 2T1 days for the first test interval only. The
pump is tested with an initial interval of T2 days. After the
first testing of all components, the test intervals are all set
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to T2 days, thus perfect staggering. The diesels are tested
first since it has been shown that the components with the
greatest failure rate should be tested prior to components
with smaller testing intervals. This results in smaller
unavailabilities.
Figure 4.7 is a plot of the Aux-Feed-System unavailability
versus test interval T2 using perfect staggering. From this
graph, it is obvious that there is no "best" test interval
because the curve obviously continues to decrease. Attempts were
made to test the system's components every 2 days, but the
FRANTIC code broke down. It should also be noted that already
for the 3-day test interval the code was beginning to have
underflow problems, but these were handled by the computer
fixup routine.
Figure 4.8 shows a plot of the Aux-Feed-System unavailability
versus the pump test interval. In this case, the diesels were
tested every 4 days (held constant) and the pump test interval
was varied to see its effects. The points plotted are for
pump test intervals of integer multiples of the diesel test
interval. The test intervals of 10 and 30 days are also
included to see this effect, but due to staggering problems
these unavailabilities did not lie on the curve. It is possible
to lower these unavailabilities using appropriate staggering
methods. From this figure, it is apparent that testing the
diesels every 4 days according to perfect staggering and the
pump every 8 days results in a minimum unavailability of approxi-
mately 5x10 8 which is a considerable improvement over the
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values found by the Jacobs method in Section 4.4 which was
ATotal= 2 .159xlO Therefore, it can be concluded that the
methods discussed in Section4.4 do not yield optimum test.
intervals. In any case, it should be carefully noticed that
neither result for the test intervals is implemented at the
plant site.
By fully recognizing this difficulty, a study was initiated
to investigate test intervals which could be practically scheduled
on site. Since the diesel failure rate is not equal to that of
the pump-valve train, tests were not only done on an equal test
basis for all components but the pump test was also varied
holding the diesel test interval constant. The basic test
intervals, T2, for the diesels were selected as 7, 10, 14, 15
days because it was deemed that these could relatively easily
be scheduled on site.
With respect to staggered tests, the diesel tests were
staggered on as nearly a perfect basis as possible, i.e., since
there are two diesel trains, the interval between diesel tests
equals one half the diesel test; interval. This interval was
rounded off to the nearest day. In the course of using the
FRANTIC code to determine the "best" test intervals, it was
found that testing a diesel on the day prior to testing the pump
resulted in the lowest unavailabilities. This was obtained by
still following the perfect staggered pattern for the diesel.
For example, the time scale shown below displays the testing of the
diesels every 7 days and the pump every 14 days using the method
described above.
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Figure 4.9 shows the results of testing the diesels for the
aforementioned 4 different test intervals along with the varying
pump test interval. From this figure, it is apparent that the
"best" practical test intervals for the diesels and the pump
are 7 days, respectively, because these test intervals result in the
lowest unavailability of the Aux-Feed-System. By referring
back to Figure 4.7 , the unavailability for testing the system
components every 4 days using perfect staggering between all
components is approximately 6.5x10 8. As can be seen from
Figure 4.9, the testing of the components every 7 days results in
about the same unavailability, which is the combined result of the
different staggering methods employed.
It is worth mentioning that the doubling of the pump test
interval from 7 to 14 days does not significantly increase the
unavailability of the Aux-Feed-System. (Note, the diesel test
interval is still kept at 7 days. However, doubling the
diesel test from 7 to 14 days results in a substantial increase
in system unavailability. This is due to the fact that there
are two diesel trains and that the diesel failure rate is by an
order of magnitude higher than that of the pump.
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A final note should be addressed to the presentation of the
curves in Figure 4.9. The data generated by FRANTIC represent
actually discrete unavailabilities. These were connected by
continuous lines to display the effect of increasing test
intervals. The actual system unavailability for pump test
intervals other than those used for the plots is unknown.
4.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
In the search for optimum test intervals, it has been shown
that one cannot solve for the optimum test interval of single
components and expect these test intervals to result in a minimum
mean unavailability for the system as a whole. Note that the
best result for the method of Section 4.4, the Jacobs method,
combined with perfect staggering yields a mean unavailability of
2.159x10- 7 versus a mean unavailability of 4.815xl0-8 using test
intervals of 3 days and perfect staggering (trial and error method)
of Section 4.5 . While this unavailability has not beenshown
to be a minimum for the system since FRANTIC breaks down for
intervals less than 3 days, this unavailability is a reduction of
a factor of 4.5 over that obtained by the Jacobs method. In
addition, it is shown in Figure 4.9 that by using more practical
test intervals the unavailability can be reduced to less than
what has been obtained by the Jacobs method. Therefore, it is
concluded that the system unavailability, while being determined
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by individual component unavailabilities is not optimized by
utilizing test intervals that are determined as optimum for the
individual components.
By increasing the redundancy of a system, the optimum test
intervals of the component decrease from their optimum test
interval when a component is considered individually. This
occurs because while one component is being tested, the other
redundant components are available to provide the required
function. Therefore, for identical trains, the test interval for
a one-out-of-two system is smaller than the test interval for a
one-out-of-one while a one-out-of-three system would allow for
smaller optimum test intervals than a one-out-of-two system.
The results shown in this chapter are for components where
only failure rate, testing time, repair time, test interval and
test procedure are considered. More complexity can be brought
into the picture by including the additional effects of
override unavailability, test induced failure, and test inefficiency.
However, it cannot be overemphasized enough that the main problem
with implementing these last three parameters is the lack of real
plant data. For this reason, the results for very small test
intervals should be taken with caution because they do not reflect
the possible degrading effects of too frequent testing.
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5. Test Interval Optimization Study for the Emergency Power System
5.1 Introduction
Upon agreement of the sponsors, the Emergency Power System
of the Maine Yankee power plant was chosen for this study. The
one-line diagram of the emergency busses as shown in Figure 5.1
has been extracted from the more elaborate electrical system
diagram.
The Emergency Power System (EPS)' consists of:
1. Two sources of off-site AC power.
2. Two sources of on-site AC power consisting of two diesel
generator sets called DGA and DGB in Figure 5.1 and in
what follows.
3. Four sources of DC power.
4. Auxiliary equipment including transformers, busses and
cables for the distribution of power to the Engineered
Safety Features (ESF) loads.
The principal function of the EPS is to provide power to the
ESF systems in case of accidents and loss of off-site AC power.
The undesirable event for the development of the fault tree
has been defined as "Insufficient Power to Engineered Safety
Features", and is used in the following sections. This definition
of the top event includes all states of the EPS which inhibit
perfect operation of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF).
Insufficient power is, in general, the coincident loss of two
mutually redundant bus trains.
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Figure 5.1: One Line Diagram of Maine Yankee Emergency Buses
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The EPS, as studied in the following, originates at the high
voltage substation and terminates at the distribution busses
which serve the ESF levels.
Each of the two redundant trains consists of five different
busses which lead to 25 different combinations resulting in the
top event. Figure 5.2 shows the major failure events which
contribute to the top event. The complexity of the tree is
quite apparent from this figure. Fortunately, it is sufficient
to evaluate only one train for the analysis of the tree, because
of the redundancy in each of the available components.
5.2 Collection and Analysis of Diesel Generator Failure Data
A literature survey on operational data of D.G. and related
systems turned up 96 failures in the United States with respect
to start and assuming power of the minimum number of 3208 starts
over the three-year period 1975 to 1977. These data and
their analysis are summarized in Appendix A and the results of
this study for failure rate and unavailability per demand were
already used in Chapter 3.
The results of the literature survey are compared to the
values used in the Reactor Safety Study [7] in Table 5.1. The
RSS had obviously used data available up to 1973 [271. As can
be seen from Table 5.1, the differences between both data sources
are negligible for most cases. For the present study, the most
conservative data as resulting from both data sources are
displayed in the last column of this table and are used for the
following fault tree evaluation.
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Odd No. refer to Emergency train related to Bus 5
Even No. refer to Emergency train related to Bus 6.
Figure 5 2 Maine Yankee Emergency Power System Fault Tree
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It should be noticed that the gathering of data as described
above faces several difficulties. This is especially due to the
fact that the D.G. units examined differ substantially with
respect to design and power rating. Thus, each category should
be analyzed separately and would certainly result in
different failure rates. However, there are not enough data
available which would allow the consistent analysis described
above. Therefore, despite recognition of the special need for
more consistency, it has been decided to use the overall failure
frequency for the analysis of the literature survey. This seems
to be a conservative assumption, especially in light of the fact
that no malfunctioning has been reported for Maine Yankee thus far.
All other component data needed to complete the fault tree
evaluation were taken from WASH-1400. In cases where no data
were available, conservative estimates have been made with
respect to the failure rates and repair times.
5.3 Unavailability Calculation of the 4160V Emergency Busses
5.3.1 Fault Tree Reduction
The availability of the power to the Engineered Safety
Features is governed by the availability of the 4160V busses
because the loss of these busses, 5 and 6, would immediately
result in the loss of AC power to the ESF. Therefore, the
analysis of the unavailability of the 4160V bus has been selected
as being the most important issue for this study.
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Figure 5.3 shows the fault tree diagram of Bus 5. This tree
can be equally applied for Bus 6 if the manual circuit breaker
5R, which connects to Bus 5 from the reserve station transformer
X-16, is neglected.
By using well-known principles of fault tree analysis, the
fault tree diagram as shown in Figure 5.3 can be further reduced
as depicted in Figure 5 .4. This reduction is deemed to have no
major impact upon the evaluation of the probability of occurrence
of the top event. It is desirable from the point of view of a
parametric study, and it is necessary in order to come up with a
reasonably simple system whose system function, needed as input
to FRANTIC, can be found without great difficulty.
Table 5.2 summarizes the data used for the primary events in
this study.
5.3.2 Results
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the results of the study as obtained
by the FRANTIC code for the point unavailability and the mean and
peak unavailabilities of the system, respectively.
Figure 5.5 displays the point unavailability of Bus 5 over
one full period, whereas Mean A and Max A are shown in Figure 5.6
as function of D.G. test interval.
As Figure 5.5 shows, for (EDG)=3xlO -5hr- 1, the point
unavailability displays the familiar characteristics, namely that
during the test itself the unavailability increases, drops to a
low level at repair and decreases further after repair beyond which
it starts to increase again due to random failure.
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Figure 5.3 Bus 5 Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 5.4: Reduced Fault Tree for 4160V Bus 5
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Table 5.2: Component and Event Data Used in this Study
Component 1 6 T2 T1 TC TR Pf QD
hr x 10 days days hour hour
1. D.G. 30(3000)* 50+ 25+ 1.5 21 10 4 0
2. D.G.I. Con. 250 -- -- -- 1.0 -- --
3. Oper. Error -- -- -- -- - 10-
4. Net Con. 11 -- -- -- 1.0 -- --
5. Net 30 -- -- -- 3.0 -- --
6. B. 5 LBF 2 -- -- -- 1.0 -- --
*No. in parentheses represents the
+T2 and T1 vary from 50 and 25, to2 1
A(EDG) for conservative run.
25 and 12 days.
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Figure 5.6: Effect of D.G. Test Interval
on Unavailability of 4160V
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By increasing the failure rate to (EDG)=3xlO-3hr- 1,
Figure 5.5 shows a different point unavailability behavior, where
obviously the contribution due to the test results in a lower
unavailability than what is contributed by repair and random
failure. This is certainly wrong and shows the inherent
limitations of the FRANTIC code as a result of the various
approximations employed. At this point, it should be recalled
that for T0.01 the FRANTIC results become more and more
questionable. Moreover, it should be noticed that the unavaila-
bility of the system for the very conservative estimate of
X(EDG)=3xlO-3hr- 1 is primarily the result of the contribution of
the loss of off-site power, because for a 50-day test interval
the D.G. is already in the failed state. This can be clearly
demonstrated by examining the approximation for the unavailability
as applied in FRANTIC, i.e.,
T + TR
q XT2 + q T2 2 T2
By neglecting the two last terms, the D.G. unavailability
becomes q=l.8 and is thus already unrealistically larger than
unity for T2=50d. In fact, the calculations show that for the data
chosen, the D.G. fails after 26.5 days.
The foregoing example clearly demonstrates that results
generated by codes such as FRANTIC have to be taken with care.
This is especially important because as Figure 5.6 reveals,
nothing peculiar can be noticed from the curves for Mean A and
Max A.
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As can be seen from Figure 5.6, the mean unavailability of
the system ranges from 3.24x10- 6 to 3.92x10- 6 when the test
interval of the D.G.s is changed from 25 to 50 days for the case
of X(EDG)=3xlO-hr - . The maximum unavailability, i.e., the
value of A during test, stays constant at a value of 1.03x10 4
over the whole range.
At this point it should be remembered that these results
are generated for a set of failure rates which must be considered
conservative when compared to actual experience.
When the D.G. failure rate would assume the overly conservative
value of (EDG)=3xlO 3hrI, the mean unavailability increases
by an order of magnitude and changes from 9.7x10- 5 to 1.79x10- 4
whereas the maximum unavailability changes from 1.84x0 - 4 to
3.65x10- 4 over the range of test intervals from 25 days to 50 days.
5.3.3 Discussion and Conclusion
From the results presented in the foregoing section, it
becomes apparent that the lack of reliable data forces the analyst
to make conservative and possibly nonrealistic assumptions which
may lead to results which are in fact not representative for the
system under consideration. Hence, a consistent and realistic
analysis is only possible to the extent to which reliable data
are available.
The results of Figures 5.5 and 5.6 suggest that the failure
rate of the D.G. should not be higher than 10 hr- 1 according to
the following arguments. As depicted by the individual point in
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Figure 5.6 characterized as U.S.N.P.P., the U.S. nuclear power
plant experience indicates an unavailability of both on-site and
-10
off-site AC power at the same time not greater than 9x10 . For
the assumption of (EDG)=3x10 5hr 1 and simultaneous D.G. test,
the maximum unavailability is 10 , whereas this is reduced to
4x10 10 for a perfect staggered test procedure.
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5.4 Study of the Additional Effect of D.G. Unavailability per
Demand Upon the Unavailability of Bus 5
In order to study the additional effect of variations in the
component data, the single bus failure has been reexamined by
assuming that the D.G. not only fails randomly as was assumed in
the previous section, but that it is characterized by a constant
unavailability per demand in addition.
Table 5.3 summarizes the input data for this study which used
the same reduced fault tree as shown in Figure 5.3. Two cases
were studied with these data. The first one considered the D.G.
as being perfectly available, i.e., q =O, whereas the second one
-2
assumed q=10 /demand.
Figure 5.7 shows the results for both cases as a function of
D.G. test interval. As can be seen, the additional impact of a
constant unavailability per demand is to increase the mean
unavailability of the bus by about a factor of two, whereas the
peak unavailability remains unaffected.
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Table 5.3: Input Data for Single Bus Failure Study with
Additional D.G. Unavailability (See Figure 5.3
for the underlying fault tree)
-1Component - Tc TR q0 qDhr hr hr -- -
1. D.G. 3 x 10 - 5 1.5 21 1.0 2 x 10 - 2
2. D.G. Intercon. 2.5 x 10 4 - 1.0 -- --
3. Operator -- -- -- -- 1 x 10
4. G.N.C. 1.1 x 10- 5 -- 1.0 -- --
5. Net 3 x 10- 5 - 3.0 -- -
6. Single bus 2.4 x 10-6 -- 1.0 -- --
T2 changes from 50 to 20 days
T1 changes from 25 to 10 days
I-140-
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5.5 Station Blackout Study
5.5.1 Introduction
For illustrative purposes, a station blackout study was per-
formed. The reasoning underlying this effort is as follows.
In case, that Buses 5 and 6 and their respective prior inter-
connections as well as grid transmission lines can be considered
as perfectly independent, the unavailability of both buses would
be just the square of the unavailabilities reported in the
previous chapters, i.e. it would fall in the range of about
10- 8 > A > 1010 However, a closer look at the system reveals
that both buses are connected to the same grid. Thus it is
deemed to be more appropriate to reconstruct the fault tree for
the top event "Insufficient Power on Both Buses 5 and 6" by
considering the loss of the grid due to a common mode of event
such as forest fire, snow storm, icing, or the like. As a
result, it is expected that the unavailability of station power
will increase compared to the value which is obtained with the
assumption of complete independence.
5.5.2 Fault Tree and Data
Fig. 5.8 shows the fault tree for the analysis of station
blackout whereas Table 5.4 summarizes the data which are used
in this study. In order to comprehend the differences introduced
into the blackout prediction, the reader is urged to compare
Figs. 5.4 and 5.8.
As with respect to the data, two cases are examined. In
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Table 5.4:
Data for Station Blackout Study
(Perfect Staggered Testing of D.G.s)
Component A
hr-'
T
r Pf
hr
1. D.G.A. 3 x 10-5 21 1 2 x 10-2 (Case 1)
0 (Case 2)
-42. D.G.A. 2.6x 10
Conn.
3 x 10
-44. D.G.B. 2.6x 10
Conn.
-55. Net 3 x 10
6. Net
Conn. -51. lx 10
Test Interval, T2:
First Test,T1:
Test Time, T:
C
21
1
3
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2
2 x 10 (Case 1)
0 (Case 2)
0
0
0
50 days to 20 days
25 days to 10 days
1.5 hr for D.G.A. and D.G.B.
3. D.G.B.
1 0 0 0
the first case (Case 1), it is assumed that the diesel generators
do not only fail randomly but that they are also subject to a
constant unavailability per demand (2 x 10 2). In the second
case (Case 2), it is assumed that the diesel-generators are per-
fectly available upon demand (qD=O). All other data are kept
the same. It should be noticed that only the case of perfect
staggered testing is examined.
5.5.3 Results and Discussion
Again, the impact of the D.G. test interval on the unavail-
ability of both buses has been studied and the results for the
two cases discussed above are displayed in Fig. 5.9. As can be
seen from this figure the mean and peak unavailabilities are
rather strongly affected by the assumptions made for the diesel-
generator failure. Thus, if only random failures are considered,
A mean ranges from 8 x 10 to 4 x 10 for the range of test
intervals considered. If in addition, a constant unavailability
-8
upon demand is accounted for, Amean increases from 8 x 10
to 1.5 x 10-7, i.e. an increase by a factor of 10 or 4, at
the end points of the spectrum for the test interval, respectively.
The same trend is apparent for the peak unavailabilities, Amax
with the only difference that these values are by one to two
orders of magnitude higher than the mean unavailabilities. A
comparison of the respective pairs of curves for A and A
mean max
reveals that for increasing test intervals the differences in
the unavalabilities decreases which is the result of the
fact that with an increased test interval the effect of random
failures increases.
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It is interesting to compare the predictions of the blackout
study with the squares of the previously obtained unavailabilities
of one bus (see Chapters 5.3.3 and 5.4). Naturally, as indicated
before, the latter values are only valid for perfectly independent
buses including the grid. With this assumption and the data shown
in Fig. 5.7 Amean would result as about 2.5 x 10 11 for both
buses being unavailable at the same time for Case 1, whereas for
-12Case 2 Aean would be even smaller, namely Amean '-9 x 10 . The
respective values for the modified fault tree are about 10 7 and
-810 respectively and show as Fig. 5.9 reveals,a much higher
sensitivity with respect to the test interval. The differences
are not as pronounced for the peak unavailabilities, which become
~ 10 8 for independent buses and are 10- 6 for the modified
tree.
In addition to the main part of this study, two individual
cases were run whose results are also displayed in Fig. 5.9 as
individual points in order to demonstrate at least the trend of
these effects. The first of the additional cases considers the
effect of a 50% probability for override during test. As can be
seen from the figure, A remains nearly unaffected, where Amean max
can be reduced by a factor of 3 by this option, thereby nearly
offsetting the impact of constant unavailability upon demand.
The second additional case includes a reduction in repair time
down to 14 hours from 21 hours originally and an increase in test
time to 3 hours up from originally 1.5 hours. Again, A is
mean
unaffected, whereas A can be reduced by a factor of 3 by thesemax
measures. The last example demonstrates clearly that the repair
time is obviously of more importance to Ama x than the test time,
at least within the limits studied here.
STUDY OF TEST CAUSED FAILURES AND DETECTION INEFFICIENCY
6.1 Introduction
All of the previous examples were evaluated under the assump-
tions that the tests performed on components of the system
as well as the detection of faults are perfect. However, it is
a well-known fact that these actions are certainly not free of
errors either induced by human failure or test actions. Unfor-
tunately, FRANTIC is not able to simulate these effects by de-
tailed models. In fact, models of these kind are even not avail-
able for general use. What remains then is to study test caused
failures and detection inefficiencies on a parametric basis.
For this purpose the FRANTIC code contains the two parameters,
Pf and P where the former is the probability for test caused
failures and the latter the probability for detection inefficiencies.
In what follows, a parametric study is presented for the
unavailability of both D.G.s at the same time.
6.2 Fault Tree and Data
Fig. 6.1 shows the simplified fault tree used in this study.
As can be seen from this tree, an event called operational error
has been introduced which is connected to both D.G. failure
gates in order to account for imperfect testing procedure and/or
inefficient maintenance. The data which are held constant during
this study are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.
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TABLE 6.1
Component Data
Component
1 D.G.
2 DC Conn.
x
hr- 
3 x 10-5
These data are the same for events 4 and 5.
Tc
hr
1.5
TR
hr
21
1 0 -4
.
__
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6.3 Study of Test Caused Failures
It is assumed that both D.G.'s are tested on a perfect staggered
basis. The contribution by operational errors is specified as
being constant for a given test interval. This constant, qD, is
increased with increased test frequency in order to account for
the fact that increased testing may lead to a higher contribution
by operational errors. For each test interval, T2, and associated
constant operator unavailability, qD, the probability of test
caused failures, Pf, changed parametrically as shown in Table
6.2. This table also summarizes the results for peak and mean
unavailabilities. As can be seen from these results, the peak
unavailability, Amax , remains completely unaffected by changes
in Pf. The mean unavailability, Amean , slightly increases
with an increase of Pf at constant T2, These trends are summarized
in Fig. 6.2.
6.4 Study of Detection Inefficiency
The effect of the inefficiency in the detection of failures
is studied for the same test intervals. Table 6.3 summarizes
the variations of the parameters considered in this analysis
as well as the results for the mean and peak unavailabilities.
For a given test interval, the probability for test caused failures
is held constant. This constant decreases with increased test
interval. The probability for detection inefficiency as well
as qD are changed parametrically for each T2. Again, for increased
test interval, qD has been chosen to decrease.
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TABLE 6.2
Data and Results of the Parametric Study of Test Caused Failures
(Perfect Staggered Testing)
5 x 10-3
5 x 10 - 4
10-4
5 x 10-3
Amean
1.914 x 10-4
1.99 x 10- 4
5 x 10-2 12.686 x 10- 4
10-4 1.145 x 10- 4
5 x 10- 4 11.148 x 10-4
5 x 10-2
10-4
10-3
1.151 x 10- 4
1.490 x 10- 4
1.615 x 10- 4
1.620 x 10- 4
5 x 10-3 1.646 x 10- 4
Amax
8.74 x 10-3
8.74 x 10-3
8.74 x 10-3
7.856 x 10-3
7.856 x 10-3
7.856 x 10-3
7.856 x 10-3
1.106 x 10 -'2
1.106 x 10-2
1.106 x 10-2
1.678 x 10- 4
days
10
20
30
1.10 x 10-210-2
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TABLE 6.3
Data and Results of the Parametric Study
of Detection Inefficiencies
(Perfect Staggered Testing)
qD
5 x 10-3
5 x 10-3
10-2
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10-3
10-
10-
10-4
10-4
.o 
Pf
10-3
10-3
10-3
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10 - 4
5 x 10 - 4
10-4
10-4
10-4
P
5 x 10 - 3
5 x 10 - 3
10-3
5 x 10- 3
10-2
5 x 10-3
10-3
10-2
5 x 10 - 2
Amean
2.136
1.968
3.977
x 10 - 4
x 10- 4
x 10-4
1.177 x 10-4
1.296 x 10- 4
1.45 x 10- 4
2.567 x 10-4
1.31 x 10-2
1.357 x 10-2
2.378 x 10-2
1.106 x 10-2
Amax
1.004
8.99
1.5
x 10 - 2
x 10- 3
x 10 - 3
8.11 x 10-3
9.127 x 10- 3
1.04 x 10-2
1.36 x 10-2
1.65 x 10- 4
1.968 x 10- 4
3.78 x 10- 4
1.615 x 10- 4
T2
days
10
20
30
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The various trends observed in the results of Table 6.3
are more easily displayed in graphs. For example, Fig. 6.3
shows the effect of detection inefficiency upon Amean and Amax
for T2 = 20 days, Pf = 5 x 10- 4 and qD = 5 x 10- 4. Both unavail-
abilities increase slightly when P is changed by an order of
magnitude from 10-3 to 10-2. When qD is increased by a factor
of 10 both unavailabilities increase by about 3 and 1.5 respectively
for P = 5 x 10-3.
The same trends can be observed in Fig. 6.4 for T2 = 30 days,
Pf = 10- 4 and qD = 10-4.
6.5 Conclusion and Discussion
As a result of both studies the following conclusions can
be drawn.
- For large test intervals and their associated lower opera-
tional errors the effect of Pf is rather negligible.
- The peak unavailability remains unaffected by Pf in the range
of values considered in this study.
- If P is smaller than 10-3, its effect upon the unavailability
is negligible.
- If P is in the order of 10/0, i.e. 10-2 its effect becomes
more pronounced.
It should be noticed that although this study revealed certain
trends it does not claim that the data selected for qD, Pf and P
are by any means realistic. As already briefly mentioned in the
introduction of this chapter, no models exist which would allow
consistent calculations of human reliability and wear out charac-
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teristics of too frequent tests. Therefore, parametric studies
of the kind used in this chapter remain the only option to assess
the effect of test caused failures and the probability of undetected
failures.
It is quite obvious, that in these areas much work remains
to be done. In the meantime, engineering judgement is the only
way to overcome the apparent lack of models.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results of
this study.
Analytical methods are available which allow the explicit
determination of optimum test intervals for single component systems
and k-out-of-n systems. Their applications to systems of technical
interest are limited however. Despite these short comings, the
analytical methods offer a comprehensible way to study major effects
and parameters which influence the system unavailability. For
this reason, they are recommended as a starting point for test
interval optimization studies. Jacob's methodology seems to be
the easiest method. The formulation by Colemand and Abrams offers
the highest flexibility in terms of additional parameters considered.
However, by accounting for these parameters, such as detection
inefficiency, imperfect test,and the like, the optimum test interval
can be only obtained implicitly by iterative methods.
The only reliable method for determining optimum test inter-
vals for complex technical systems is by computer code. For this
purpose, the code FRANTIC has been implemented and benchmarked
at MIT against analytical methods as well as other more sophis-
ticated codes such as PL-MODT. The results of these studies clearly
show that FRANTIC can be recommended for practical engineering day-
to-day work. All of the approximations employed in the code render
it conservative compared to more elaborate methods.
Several simplified engineered safety systems have been studied
with FRANTIC. These studies indicated the importance of the test
strategies for redundant systems as well as the need for the deter-
mination of point unavailabilities which are provided by FRANTIC.
The comparison of optimum test intervals determined by analytic
means and those derived from FRANTIC showed that the former do
not provide the minimum unavailabilities for more complex systems.
Due to the existence of several components in those systems which
are tested at different times and for different periods the func-
tional dependence of the system unavailability versus the test
interval of one component, say the D.G., of this system does not
necessarily display the unique curve which is obtained for a single
component. One additional reason for this is the lack of appro-
priate wearout models in codes like FRANTIC.
Despite the successful application of FRANTIC for the small
systems studied during this research, some of its shortcomings
are worth mentioning. These are summarized below.
- The reason that only small systems were analyzed lies
in the inconvenience for the user to derive the system
unavailability function for input into FRANTIC. This
function is difficult to obtain for complex systems.
In order to avoid the derivation and possible errors
which may occur during this process, FRANTIC should be
coupled to a code which automatically determines the
minimal cut sets.
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The code does not account for wearout and its impact
upon failure rates.
No reliable information is available for detection in-
efficiency. This problem is closely related to human
reliability which is an area not well understood thus
far.
There exists a substantial uncertainty in most of the
input data. However, FRANTIC does not allow the pro-
pagation of these uncertainties to the top event. It
is recommended therefore, that FRANTIC should be coupled
to a Monte-Carlo simulation package which allows for
a broad spectrum of possible distributions.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned drawbacks, it is thought that
the methodology developed during this research project provides
a good basis for the technical assessment of optimum test interval.
Continued efforts in this field are strongly recommended because
reliability and availability allocations will certainly be inte-
gral parts of system design in the near future.
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APPENDIX A
Collection and Analysis of
Diesel Generator Performance Data
and Related Equipment
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A literature survey on operational data of diesel genera-
tors and related equipment turned up 96 failures in the U.S.
with respect to start and assuming load over the minimum number
of 3208 starts in the three years period from 1975-1977. Table A-i
summarizes the whole data set. These data were the basis from
which failure rate and unavailability per demand were derived.
It is worth mentioning here that the diesel generators covered
in the review differ substantially with respect to design and
power rating. Therefore, each category would result in differ-
ent failure rates. Despite of recognizing this fundamental dif-
ference, it has been decided to use the overall failures for the
analysis. This seems to be a conservative assumption although
it should be realized that larger sized units may be subject
to more failures especially when those units are newly introduced
on themarket. Another conservatism has been introduced into the
analysis by considering both PWR and BWR systems. The data have
been analyzed in accordance with the formulation used in the
Reactor Safety Study. Thus, the failure rate follows from
nf
NpNcT
where:
n : number of failures observed
Np : number of plants
N : average number of components per plant
T : observed (standby) time period (8760 hrs)
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TABLE A-1
Diesel Generator Failure Data for the Period
1975-1977 U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
Diesel Generator Failure
Plants Units Min. No. of starts Category A Category B
Calvert Cliffs 1
Calvert Cliffs 2
Pilgrim 1
Conn. Yankee
Indian Point 1
Indian Point 2
Indian Point 3
Beaver Valley
Oyster Creck
Maine Yankee
Three Mile Island
Nine Mile Island:.
Fitzpatrick
Millstone 1
Millstone 2
Peach Bottom 2
Peach Bottom 3
Ginna
Vermont Yankee 2
Dresden 1
Dresden 2
Dresden 3
Zion 1
Zion 2
Quad Cities 1
Quad Cities 2
Cook 1
Arnold
Cooper
Monticello
Prairie Island 1
Prairie Island 2
Fort Calboun
Point Beach 1
Point Beach 2
Kewannee
Arkansas
Brunswick 2
Turkey Point 3
Turkey Point 4
St. Lucie
Crystal River
Hatch 1
Browns Ferry 1
Browns Ferry 2
Browns Ferry 3
Surry 1
2
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
3
2
2
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
31
8
72
72
108
16
72
' 72
72
72
48
36
216
72
36
72
72
36
72
36
188
72
72
36
72
72
108
72
72
72
72
72
72
56
72
24
18
48
84
63
2
2
2
1(F.T.C.)
1(F.T.C.)3
1
11
3
1 (Fire)
1 (F.T.C.)
I(F.T.C.)
1
7
2
2,1
21
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
3
(F.T.C.)
1 (F.T.C.)
1
1 (F.T.C.)
72
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Diesel Generator
Min. No. of starts Category A
Failure
Category B
Surry 2
Humbolt Bay
Trojan
Rondo Seco
San Onofre 1
Yankee Rowe
Big Rock Point
Palisades
La Crosse
Total
Notation: Category A:
Category B:
Diesel Generator failed to start
Diesel Generator failed to run continuously
Diesel Generator Circuit Breaker failed to close
Plants Units
1
1
2
2
2
3
1
2
1
95
36
36
38
64
72
108
36
72
36
3208
3
2
1
42 26
-_ 
F.T.C.:
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From Table A-1 the following value result for the parameters nf
and NpNc,
nf
NpNc
= 42 + 26 = 68
= 95
Thus,
68
95 x 3yr x 8760 hryr
= 3 x 10- 5 hr - 1
The formula for the unavailability per demand from the RSS reads
nf
Qd = NpNcNT
where:
: number of plants
: average number of components per plant
average number of tests (demands) performed
per component per year
From Table A-1 the following values result for the parameters
nf and NpNcNT
nf
NPNcNT
= 68
= 3208
Thus,
Qd = 68 = 2 x 10 2
As the Table A-1 indicates the diesel generator circuit breaker
failed to close 8 times. thus,
8 
-6 hr-1X(CCT BKR) = - x = 3.2 x 10 hr
NC
NT
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It is interesting to note that if only diesel generator failures
of category A, i.e., failure to start are considered, Qd decreases
to the following value
42 =
Qd = 3208 - 1.3 x 10-2
which is more than a factor 2 lower than the value used by the RSS.
The result of the literature survey is compared to the values
used in the RSS [7] which had obviously employed data available
up to 1973. Table A-2 summarizes the comparison. As can be
seen from the table, the differences between both data sources
are negligible for most cases. A set of recommended conservative
values is included in the last column of Table A-2 which summarizes
the most conservative ones from each of the data sources.
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TABLE A-2
Comparison of Results of a Literature Survey
for the Period 1975-77 with the Results Used
in WASH-1400
Lite Recommended
Component Quantity Literatur WASH-1400 Conservative
Survey Valve
D.G. fail to start X(EDG) 3x10- 5 hr-l 3x10-5 hr -l 3x10-5
and assume power
unavailability Qd(EDG) 2x10-2/d 3x10-2/d 3x10-2/d
upon demand
BAT. failure rate X(BAT) 1.14x10-5 hr-l 10-6 hr-l 1.14x10-5 hr-l(degraded)
unavailability Qd(BAT) 1.14x0-4/d 10-3/d 10-3/d
upon demand
NET failure rate X(NET) lx10-5 hr-l 2x10-5 hr-1 2x10- 5 hr -1
unavailability
upon demand Qd(NET) 2xl0-4/d 10-3/d 10-3/d
APPENDIX B
Statistical Analysis of Maine Yankee Experience
with Diesel Generators
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This appendix discusses the estimation of parameters and
the confidence intervals placed on those parameters. A confidence
interval is defined as being a range of values to include the
particular values of the parameters being estimated with. a pre-
assigned degree of confidence. Such an exercise will normally
define a range of values within which the true value is believed to
lie for a particular 'confidence level.' The estimated range or
interval for the parameter is termed the confidence interval and
the end points of the interval are called confidence limits. It
is a well-known fact a9] that the best way of finding these
confidence level estimates is to use the X distribution test.
For an exponential probability density function of
f(t) = e
where 0 is the true failure rate per unit time.
t is the time range
the true failure rate, , can be found from the estimated
failure rate, , from the sample population within the confidence
level of p by the following expression .89].
^ 2 ^ 2
0e2, X1e< e02,2
f f
where,
f = 2(n) degrees of freedom
n = NO of failure during the testing period T
n
0 
2 = lower confidence limit of N test with probability
X2,.1
of 1 -p and degrees of freedom of f
2
X2 = upper confidence limit of test with probability
of l+p and degrees of freedom of f.
2
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NOTE: For the case of no failure during the testing period T,
obviously, the straightforward estimate of the mean failure
rate would be zero. However, there is always a possibility
that the last failure will not occur before the termination
of the testing period. Therefore, in practice, one failure
will be considered for the test.
In our situation, Main Yankee, there was no failure after
five years of operation. Therefore
T = 5 x 8760 = 4380 hr
n = 1
f = 2
and considering three diferent confidence levels of 50, 90,
and 99%, the true failure rates will have the following ranges:
confidence level% 50 90 99
upper limit 1.58 6.84 12.1
o (1 hr) x 105
lower limit 1.58 0.1175 0.0114
lower limit <0 < upper limit
Comparison of the above results and the results from the Appendix A
suggests that our analysis with = 3 x 10- 5 is quite consistent
with that of Main Yankee with 90% confidence. It is also worth
mentioning that with the aforementioned confidence level the mean
unavailability will be
Q .t t = 720hr (one month)
4.23 x 10- <O < 2.46 x 10-2
which is again consistent with our goal unavailability which was
discussed in the text of the report.
APPENDIX C
Description of the Remainder of the
Fault Tree Appearing in Fig. 5.2
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For complete drawing of the Fig. 5.2, a thorough
knowledge of the emergency power system was required, and
since we were only interested in the 4160 V emergency
buses the expanded fault tree of these buses, 5 and 6,
which in fact are the same was given in Fig. 5.3. For
the rest of the numbers referred to in Fig. 5.2 the top
event failures are given here only.
Numbers Failure Events
11 & 12 I.P. on Buses (4160 V) 5 and 6
13 & 14 I.P. on Buses (480 V) 7 and 8
15 & 16 I.P. on Buses (480 V) MCC-7A & 8A
17 & 18 I.P. on Buses (480 V) MCC-7B & 8B
19 & 20 I.P. on Buses (125 VC) DC-A & DC-B
21 & 22 DC Buses of Train A or B Shorted
I.P. is Insufficient Power
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